ECCouncil 312-38 (Certified Network Defender) Practice Test 75

Question 740

To flag unusually long and random-looking subdomain queries to one domain, which method is designed for the task?

  1. Connection-count baseline
  2. DNS entropy analysis
  3. Lateral SMB activity
  4. Bandwidth baseline
  5. East-west scanning detection

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

High-entropy names can indicate tunneling but require false-positive checks for legitimate telemetry; that is why it addresses the operational task to flag unusually long and random-looking subdomain queries to one domain.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Per-host flow frequency comparisons reveal scanning or command activity beyond known user behavior; that is useful when the task is to detect a workstation opening hundreds of unusual outbound sessions, not the stated requirement to flag unusually long and random-looking subdomain queries to one domain.

C:

SMB flow patterns can expose movement attempts when combined with identity and host events; its operational purpose is to investigate a user workstation suddenly connecting to many peers on SMB ports, not to achieve the specific requirement to flag unusually long and random-looking subdomain queries to one domain.

D:

Historical utilization by time and application supports anomaly thresholds that account for routine peaks; applying it would serve notice a branch link consuming far more outbound traffic than usual without directly satisfying the goal to flag unusually long and random-looking subdomain queries to one domain.

E:

Breadth and timing of failed connections can distinguish reconnaissance from normal business applications; it addresses the different need to find sequential connection attempts across many internal ports and hosts, leaving the requested ability to flag unusually long and random-looking subdomain queries to one domain unresolved.

Question 741

To find repeat short connections to one external host at regular intervals, what technique should the team use?

  1. Periodic beacon detection
  2. Bandwidth baseline
  3. Connection-count baseline
  4. Unusual DNS resolver detection
  5. East-west scanning detection
  6. DNS entropy analysis

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Temporal analysis detects potential command-and-control polling without relying on known payload signatures; its relevant protective or investigative effect is to find repeat short connections to one external host at regular intervals.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Historical utilization by time and application supports anomaly thresholds that account for routine peaks; that is useful when the task is to notice a branch link consuming far more outbound traffic than usual, not the stated requirement to find repeat short connections to one external host at regular intervals.

C:

Per-host flow frequency comparisons reveal scanning or command activity beyond known user behavior; a team would select it to detect a workstation opening hundreds of unusual outbound sessions, which does not provide the particular result to find repeat short connections to one external host at regular intervals.

D:

Flow data identifies outbound queries to unexpected resolver addresses despite local policy; its operational purpose is to discover a device bypassing approved recursive DNS infrastructure, not to achieve the specific requirement to find repeat short connections to one external host at regular intervals.

E:

Breadth and timing of failed connections can distinguish reconnaissance from normal business applications; applying it would serve find sequential connection attempts across many internal ports and hosts without directly satisfying the goal to find repeat short connections to one external host at regular intervals.

F:

High-entropy names can indicate tunneling but require false-positive checks for legitimate telemetry; it addresses the different need to flag unusually long and random-looking subdomain queries to one domain, leaving the requested ability to find repeat short connections to one external host at regular intervals unresolved.

Question 742

To spot large overnight transfers from an internal archive server, which protective or investigative measure applies?

  1. Data exfiltration volume alert
  2. Protocol-on-unusual-port analysis
  3. Bandwidth baseline
  4. Lateral SMB activity

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Flow byte counters and destination reputation identify unusual egress for investigation; the requested outcome is precisely to spot large overnight transfers from an internal archive server.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Protocol dissection compares actual handshake behavior with expected port conventions; it could help someone trying to detect HTTPS-like traffic concealed on a nonstandard destination port, but the problem is instead to spot large overnight transfers from an internal archive server.

C:

Historical utilization by time and application supports anomaly thresholds that account for routine peaks; that is useful when the task is to notice a branch link consuming far more outbound traffic than usual, not the stated requirement to spot large overnight transfers from an internal archive server.

D:

SMB flow patterns can expose movement attempts when combined with identity and host events; a team would select it to investigate a user workstation suddenly connecting to many peers on SMB ports, which does not provide the particular result to spot large overnight transfers from an internal archive server.

Question 743

To find sequential connection attempts across many internal ports and hosts, what is the most direct option?

  1. Unusual DNS resolver detection
  2. East-west scanning detection
  3. Protocol-on-unusual-port analysis
  4. JA3-style TLS fingerprint review

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Breadth and timing of failed connections can distinguish reconnaissance from normal business applications; this choice fits the scenario because the team must find sequential connection attempts across many internal ports and hosts.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Flow data identifies outbound queries to unexpected resolver addresses despite local policy; the outcome it supports is to discover a device bypassing approved recursive DNS infrastructure, whereas this scenario asks defenders to find sequential connection attempts across many internal ports and hosts.

C:

Protocol dissection compares actual handshake behavior with expected port conventions; it could help someone trying to detect HTTPS-like traffic concealed on a nonstandard destination port, but the problem is instead to find sequential connection attempts across many internal ports and hosts.

D:

Handshake fingerprints provide correlation hints but can be spoofed or shared by benign software; that is useful when the task is to cluster client TLS behavior that differs from a host's normal applications, not the stated requirement to find sequential connection attempts across many internal ports and hosts.

Question 744

To investigate a user workstation suddenly connecting to many peers on SMB ports, what should defenders select?

  1. Baseline change annotation
  2. East-west scanning detection
  3. Lateral SMB activity
  4. Unusual DNS resolver detection

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

SMB flow patterns can expose movement attempts when combined with identity and host events; this mechanism directly supports the requirement to investigate a user workstation suddenly connecting to many peers on SMB ports.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Change-calendar context explains legitimate shifts and improves anomaly-model tuning; its mechanism supports prevent scheduled software rollouts from triggering persistent false alerts, while the requested control must be able to investigate a user workstation suddenly connecting to many peers on SMB ports.

B:

Breadth and timing of failed connections can distinguish reconnaissance from normal business applications; the outcome it supports is to find sequential connection attempts across many internal ports and hosts, whereas this scenario asks defenders to investigate a user workstation suddenly connecting to many peers on SMB ports.

D:

Flow data identifies outbound queries to unexpected resolver addresses despite local policy; it could help someone trying to discover a device bypassing approved recursive DNS infrastructure, but the problem is instead to investigate a user workstation suddenly connecting to many peers on SMB ports.

Question 745

To discover a device bypassing approved recursive DNS infrastructure, which mechanism best fits?

  1. Protocol-on-unusual-port analysis
  2. Unusual DNS resolver detection
  3. Lateral SMB activity
  4. East-west scanning detection
  5. Baseline change annotation

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Flow data identifies outbound queries to unexpected resolver addresses despite local policy; it supplies the specific control needed to discover a device bypassing approved recursive DNS infrastructure.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Protocol dissection compares actual handshake behavior with expected port conventions; the technique works for situations involving detect HTTPS-like traffic concealed on a nonstandard destination port, rather than this need to discover a device bypassing approved recursive DNS infrastructure.

C:

SMB flow patterns can expose movement attempts when combined with identity and host events; the outcome it supports is to investigate a user workstation suddenly connecting to many peers on SMB ports, whereas this scenario asks defenders to discover a device bypassing approved recursive DNS infrastructure.

D:

Breadth and timing of failed connections can distinguish reconnaissance from normal business applications; although relevant to find sequential connection attempts across many internal ports and hosts, it does not by itself achieve the required task to discover a device bypassing approved recursive DNS infrastructure.

E:

Change-calendar context explains legitimate shifts and improves anomaly-model tuning; it could help someone trying to prevent scheduled software rollouts from triggering persistent false alerts, but the problem is instead to discover a device bypassing approved recursive DNS infrastructure.

Question 746

To detect HTTPS-like traffic concealed on a nonstandard destination port, which measure best meets the requirement?

  1. Unusual DNS resolver detection
  2. Lateral SMB activity
  3. Baseline change annotation
  4. Protocol-on-unusual-port analysis

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Protocol dissection compares actual handshake behavior with expected port conventions; that is why it addresses the operational task to detect HTTPS-like traffic concealed on a nonstandard destination port.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Flow data identifies outbound queries to unexpected resolver addresses despite local policy; it addresses the different need to discover a device bypassing approved recursive DNS infrastructure, leaving the requested ability to detect HTTPS-like traffic concealed on a nonstandard destination port unresolved.

B:

SMB flow patterns can expose movement attempts when combined with identity and host events; the technique works for situations involving investigate a user workstation suddenly connecting to many peers on SMB ports, rather than this need to detect HTTPS-like traffic concealed on a nonstandard destination port.

C:

Change-calendar context explains legitimate shifts and improves anomaly-model tuning; its mechanism supports prevent scheduled software rollouts from triggering persistent false alerts, while the requested control must be able to detect HTTPS-like traffic concealed on a nonstandard destination port.

Question 747

To cluster client TLS behavior that differs from a host's normal applications and to prevent scheduled software rollouts from triggering persistent false alerts, which TWO measures should the defender select? Choose TWO.

  1. Lateral SMB activity
  2. Protocol-on-unusual-port analysis
  3. East-west scanning detection
  4. JA3-style TLS fingerprint review
  5. Baseline change annotation

Explanation

Correct Answers

D:

Handshake fingerprints provide correlation hints but can be spoofed or shared by benign software; this is the measure that can cluster client TLS behavior that differs from a host's normal applications as one of the separately stated outcomes.

E:

Change-calendar context explains legitimate shifts and improves anomaly-model tuning; this is the measure that can prevent scheduled software rollouts from triggering persistent false alerts as one of the separately stated outcomes.

Incorrect Answers

A:

SMB flow patterns can expose movement attempts when combined with identity and host events; applying it would serve investigate a user workstation suddenly connecting to many peers on SMB ports without directly satisfying the goal to cluster client TLS behavior that differs from a host's normal applications and to prevent scheduled software rollouts from triggering persistent false alerts.

B:

Protocol dissection compares actual handshake behavior with expected port conventions; it addresses the different need to detect HTTPS-like traffic concealed on a nonstandard destination port, leaving the requested ability to cluster client TLS behavior that differs from a host's normal applications and to prevent scheduled software rollouts from triggering persistent false alerts unresolved.

C:

Breadth and timing of failed connections can distinguish reconnaissance from normal business applications; the technique works for situations involving find sequential connection attempts across many internal ports and hosts, rather than this need to cluster client TLS behavior that differs from a host's normal applications and to prevent scheduled software rollouts from triggering persistent false alerts.

Question 748

To prevent scheduled software rollouts from triggering persistent false alerts, what control should be selected?

  1. Baseline change annotation
  2. Protocol-on-unusual-port analysis
  3. JA3-style TLS fingerprint review
  4. Unusual DNS resolver detection

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Change-calendar context explains legitimate shifts and improves anomaly-model tuning; the requested outcome is precisely to prevent scheduled software rollouts from triggering persistent false alerts.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Protocol dissection compares actual handshake behavior with expected port conventions; applying it would serve detect HTTPS-like traffic concealed on a nonstandard destination port without directly satisfying the goal to prevent scheduled software rollouts from triggering persistent false alerts.

C:

Handshake fingerprints provide correlation hints but can be spoofed or shared by benign software; it addresses the different need to cluster client TLS behavior that differs from a host's normal applications, leaving the requested ability to prevent scheduled software rollouts from triggering persistent false alerts unresolved.

D:

Flow data identifies outbound queries to unexpected resolver addresses despite local policy; the technique works for situations involving discover a device bypassing approved recursive DNS infrastructure, rather than this need to prevent scheduled software rollouts from triggering persistent false alerts.

Question 749

To find the two endpoints exchanging the highest byte counts in a packet capture, which security control is most appropriate?

  1. TCP sequence graph
  2. Conversation statistics
  3. Protocol hierarchy statistics
  4. Expert Information review

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Conversation views summarize communicating pairs and traffic volumes to guide focused analysis; this choice fits the scenario because the team must find the two endpoints exchanging the highest byte counts in a packet capture.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Time-sequence plots reveal pacing, loss and recovery characteristics across a selected flow; a team would select it to visualize throughput stalls and repeated retransmissions over time, which does not provide the particular result to find the two endpoints exchanging the highest byte counts in a packet capture.

C:

Protocol summaries quantify dissected frame proportions without requiring manual packet counting; applying it would serve determine whether unexpected multicast or DNS dominates a trace without directly satisfying the goal to find the two endpoints exchanging the highest byte counts in a packet capture.

D:

Wireshark diagnostic annotations highlight noteworthy conditions but are not proof of compromise; it addresses the different need to locate malformed frames and transport anomalies in a large capture, leaving the requested ability to find the two endpoints exchanging the highest byte counts in a packet capture unresolved.

Question 750

To determine whether unexpected multicast or DNS dominates a trace, what would a network traffic analyst implement or use?

  1. Conversation statistics
  2. TCP sequence graph
  3. Expert Information review
  4. Protocol hierarchy statistics
  5. Follow TCP stream

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Protocol summaries quantify dissected frame proportions without requiring manual packet counting; this mechanism directly supports the requirement to determine whether unexpected multicast or DNS dominates a trace.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Conversation views summarize communicating pairs and traffic volumes to guide focused analysis; that is useful when the task is to find the two endpoints exchanging the highest byte counts in a packet capture, not the stated requirement to determine whether unexpected multicast or DNS dominates a trace.

B:

Time-sequence plots reveal pacing, loss and recovery characteristics across a selected flow; a team would select it to visualize throughput stalls and repeated retransmissions over time, which does not provide the particular result to determine whether unexpected multicast or DNS dominates a trace.

C:

Wireshark diagnostic annotations highlight noteworthy conditions but are not proof of compromise; its operational purpose is to locate malformed frames and transport anomalies in a large capture, not to achieve the specific requirement to determine whether unexpected multicast or DNS dominates a trace.

E:

Stream reassembly orders related TCP payload bytes when the capture is sufficiently complete; it addresses the different need to reconstruct a single unencrypted application conversation from captured packets, leaving the requested ability to determine whether unexpected multicast or DNS dominates a trace unresolved.

Certified Network Defender (312-38) Practice Tests