ECCouncil 312-38 (Certified Network Defender) Practice Test 26

Question 250

To retain executed script content for incident investigation, which security control is most appropriate?

  1. PowerShell constrained language
  2. PowerShell script block logging
  3. Print Spooler minimization
  4. Windows event forwarding
  5. Security baseline GPO

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Script-block events improve visibility into decoded or generated PowerShell activity when logging is enabled; the requested outcome is precisely to retain executed script content for incident investigation.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Language restrictions reduce script capabilities under supported application-control policy; that is useful when the task is to limit powerful dynamic scripting features in lower-trust execution contexts, not the stated requirement to retain executed script content for incident investigation.

C:

Removing unused spooler functionality reduces potential remote code and privilege attack paths; its operational purpose is to disable unnecessary printer-related service exposure on sensitive servers, not to achieve the specific requirement to retain executed script content for incident investigation.

D:

Subscriptions forward selected Windows events to collectors for correlation and retention; applying it would serve collect endpoint events centrally even if a local log is later deleted without directly satisfying the goal to retain executed script content for incident investigation.

E:

Group Policy distributes configuration requirements, subject to inheritance, filtering and refresh behavior; it addresses the different need to apply consistent hardened settings across domain-joined computers, leaving the requested ability to retain executed script content for incident investigation unresolved.

Question 251

To limit powerful dynamic scripting features in lower-trust execution contexts, what would a Windows endpoint administrator implement or use?

  1. PowerShell script block logging
  2. Windows event forwarding
  3. Print Spooler minimization
  4. PowerShell constrained language

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Language restrictions reduce script capabilities under supported application-control policy; this choice fits the scenario because the team must limit powerful dynamic scripting features in lower-trust execution contexts.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Script-block events improve visibility into decoded or generated PowerShell activity when logging is enabled; it could help someone trying to retain executed script content for incident investigation, but the problem is instead to limit powerful dynamic scripting features in lower-trust execution contexts.

B:

Subscriptions forward selected Windows events to collectors for correlation and retention; that is useful when the task is to collect endpoint events centrally even if a local log is later deleted, not the stated requirement to limit powerful dynamic scripting features in lower-trust execution contexts.

C:

Removing unused spooler functionality reduces potential remote code and privilege attack paths; a team would select it to disable unnecessary printer-related service exposure on sensitive servers, which does not provide the particular result to limit powerful dynamic scripting features in lower-trust execution contexts.

Question 252

To collect endpoint events centrally even if a local log is later deleted and to apply consistent hardened settings across domain-joined computers, which TWO measures should the defender select? Choose TWO.

  1. Windows event forwarding
  2. Security baseline GPO
  3. Print Spooler minimization
  4. SMB signing enforcement
  5. PowerShell script block logging

Explanation

Correct Answers

A:

Subscriptions forward selected Windows events to collectors for correlation and retention; this is the measure that can collect endpoint events centrally even if a local log is later deleted as one of the separately stated outcomes.

B:

Group Policy distributes configuration requirements, subject to inheritance, filtering and refresh behavior; this is the measure that can apply consistent hardened settings across domain-joined computers as one of the separately stated outcomes.

Incorrect Answers

C:

Removing unused spooler functionality reduces potential remote code and privilege attack paths; that is useful when the task is to disable unnecessary printer-related service exposure on sensitive servers, not the stated requirement to collect endpoint events centrally even if a local log is later deleted and to apply consistent hardened settings across domain-joined computers.

D:

Signing authenticates session messages where correctly negotiated but does not itself encrypt their payloads; a team would select it to detect tampering of SMB message exchanges and help resist relaying scenarios, which does not provide the particular result to collect endpoint events centrally even if a local log is later deleted and to apply consistent hardened settings across domain-joined computers.

E:

Script-block events improve visibility into decoded or generated PowerShell activity when logging is enabled; its operational purpose is to retain executed script content for incident investigation, not to achieve the specific requirement to collect endpoint events centrally even if a local log is later deleted and to apply consistent hardened settings across domain-joined computers.

Question 253

To apply consistent hardened settings across domain-joined computers, which practice addresses that objective?

  1. Windows event forwarding
  2. Security baseline GPO
  3. PowerShell script block logging
  4. PowerShell constrained language

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Group Policy distributes configuration requirements, subject to inheritance, filtering and refresh behavior; it supplies the specific control needed to apply consistent hardened settings across domain-joined computers.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Subscriptions forward selected Windows events to collectors for correlation and retention; the outcome it supports is to collect endpoint events centrally even if a local log is later deleted, whereas this scenario asks defenders to apply consistent hardened settings across domain-joined computers.

C:

Script-block events improve visibility into decoded or generated PowerShell activity when logging is enabled; it could help someone trying to retain executed script content for incident investigation, but the problem is instead to apply consistent hardened settings across domain-joined computers.

D:

Language restrictions reduce script capabilities under supported application-control policy; that is useful when the task is to limit powerful dynamic scripting features in lower-trust execution contexts, not the stated requirement to apply consistent hardened settings across domain-joined computers.

Question 254

To keep high-privilege logons away from low-trust workstations, which tool, policy, or technique is appropriate?

  1. LDAP channel binding
  2. LDAP signing enforcement
  3. Kerberos delegation audit
  4. Domain controller tier isolation

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Administrative tiering minimizes token exposure and attack pivots into directory control systems; that is why it addresses the operational task to keep high-privilege logons away from low-trust workstations.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Channel binding ties authentication to the protected TLS session where clients support it; its mechanism supports reduce credential relay against directory TLS endpoints, while the requested control must be able to keep high-privilege logons away from low-trust workstations.

B:

Signed LDAP exchanges protect authentication integrity but require compatible clients; the outcome it supports is to reject unsigned directory binds that permit some relay or tampering risks, whereas this scenario asks defenders to keep high-privilege logons away from low-trust workstations.

C:

Delegation settings can let a service impersonate clients; restrictive configuration limits abuse; although relevant to remove unnecessary unrestricted delegation from service accounts, it does not by itself achieve the required task to keep high-privilege logons away from low-trust workstations.

Question 255

To reduce credential relay against directory TLS endpoints, what safeguard would be most applicable?

  1. LDAP channel binding
  2. AD CS template review
  3. LDAP signing enforcement
  4. Domain controller tier isolation
  5. Kerberos delegation audit

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Channel binding ties authentication to the protected TLS session where clients support it; its relevant protective or investigative effect is to reduce credential relay against directory TLS endpoints.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Template permissions and subject-name rules can create impersonation paths independent of password strength; its mechanism supports identify certificate enrollment templates permitting dangerous identity claims, while the requested control must be able to reduce credential relay against directory TLS endpoints.

C:

Signed LDAP exchanges protect authentication integrity but require compatible clients; the outcome it supports is to reject unsigned directory binds that permit some relay or tampering risks, whereas this scenario asks defenders to reduce credential relay against directory TLS endpoints.

D:

Administrative tiering minimizes token exposure and attack pivots into directory control systems; although relevant to keep high-privilege logons away from low-trust workstations, it does not by itself achieve the required task to reduce credential relay against directory TLS endpoints.

E:

Delegation settings can let a service impersonate clients; restrictive configuration limits abuse; it could help someone trying to remove unnecessary unrestricted delegation from service accounts, but the problem is instead to reduce credential relay against directory TLS endpoints.

Question 256

To reject unsigned directory binds that permit some relay or tampering risks, what is the relevant defensive action?

  1. Domain controller tier isolation
  2. Domain controller auditing
  3. LDAP signing enforcement
  4. AdminSDHolder ACL review

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Signed LDAP exchanges protect authentication integrity but require compatible clients; the requested outcome is precisely to reject unsigned directory binds that permit some relay or tampering risks.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Administrative tiering minimizes token exposure and attack pivots into directory control systems; it addresses the different need to keep high-privilege logons away from low-trust workstations, leaving the requested ability to reject unsigned directory binds that permit some relay or tampering risks unresolved.

B:

Audited changes provide evidence of who modified sensitive AD objects and when; the technique works for situations involving record directory service changes affecting privileged groups and policies, rather than this need to reject unsigned directory binds that permit some relay or tampering risks.

D:

Protected-object ACL templates can reapply unauthorized grants unless their source is corrected; the outcome it supports is to detect persistent permissions on protected privileged accounts, whereas this scenario asks defenders to reject unsigned directory binds that permit some relay or tampering risks.

Question 257

To remove unnecessary unrestricted delegation from service accounts, which option most directly provides the capability?

  1. Kerberos delegation audit
  2. GPO link review
  3. Domain controller auditing
  4. LDAP channel binding

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Delegation settings can let a service impersonate clients; restrictive configuration limits abuse; this choice fits the scenario because the team must remove unnecessary unrestricted delegation from service accounts.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Scope of management, links and security filtering determine which machines receive policy; it addresses the different need to find a high-risk policy unexpectedly linked to a broad organizational unit, leaving the requested ability to remove unnecessary unrestricted delegation from service accounts unresolved.

C:

Audited changes provide evidence of who modified sensitive AD objects and when; the technique works for situations involving record directory service changes affecting privileged groups and policies, rather than this need to remove unnecessary unrestricted delegation from service accounts.

D:

Channel binding ties authentication to the protected TLS session where clients support it; its mechanism supports reduce credential relay against directory TLS endpoints, while the requested control must be able to remove unnecessary unrestricted delegation from service accounts.

Question 258

To detect persistent permissions on protected privileged accounts, which control achieves the target outcome?

  1. AD CS template review
  2. AdminSDHolder ACL review
  3. Domain controller tier isolation
  4. Kerberos delegation audit

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Protected-object ACL templates can reapply unauthorized grants unless their source is corrected; this mechanism directly supports the requirement to detect persistent permissions on protected privileged accounts.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Template permissions and subject-name rules can create impersonation paths independent of password strength; its operational purpose is to identify certificate enrollment templates permitting dangerous identity claims, not to achieve the specific requirement to detect persistent permissions on protected privileged accounts.

C:

Administrative tiering minimizes token exposure and attack pivots into directory control systems; it addresses the different need to keep high-privilege logons away from low-trust workstations, leaving the requested ability to detect persistent permissions on protected privileged accounts unresolved.

D:

Delegation settings can let a service impersonate clients; restrictive configuration limits abuse; the technique works for situations involving remove unnecessary unrestricted delegation from service accounts, rather than this need to detect persistent permissions on protected privileged accounts.

Question 259

To identify certificate enrollment templates permitting dangerous identity claims, which solution should be adopted?

  1. Kerberos delegation audit
  2. LAPS read permission review
  3. AD CS template review
  4. Domain controller auditing

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Template permissions and subject-name rules can create impersonation paths independent of password strength; it supplies the specific control needed to identify certificate enrollment templates permitting dangerous identity claims.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Delegation settings can let a service impersonate clients; restrictive configuration limits abuse; a team would select it to remove unnecessary unrestricted delegation from service accounts, which does not provide the particular result to identify certificate enrollment templates permitting dangerous identity claims.

B:

Secret read rights should be narrower than ordinary directory object read access; its operational purpose is to limit who can retrieve workstation local administrative passwords, not to achieve the specific requirement to identify certificate enrollment templates permitting dangerous identity claims.

D:

Audited changes provide evidence of who modified sensitive AD objects and when; it addresses the different need to record directory service changes affecting privileged groups and policies, leaving the requested ability to identify certificate enrollment templates permitting dangerous identity claims unresolved.

Question 260

To record directory service changes affecting privileged groups and policies, which of the available controls is suitable?

  1. AdminSDHolder ACL review
  2. Domain controller auditing
  3. LDAP channel binding
  4. DCSync rights audit
  5. LDAP signing enforcement

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Audited changes provide evidence of who modified sensitive AD objects and when; that is why it addresses the operational task to record directory service changes affecting privileged groups and policies.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Protected-object ACL templates can reapply unauthorized grants unless their source is corrected; that is useful when the task is to detect persistent permissions on protected privileged accounts, not the stated requirement to record directory service changes affecting privileged groups and policies.

C:

Channel binding ties authentication to the protected TLS session where clients support it; its operational purpose is to reduce credential relay against directory TLS endpoints, not to achieve the specific requirement to record directory service changes affecting privileged groups and policies.

D:

Replication permissions can expose directory secrets without interactive login to a domain controller; applying it would serve identify non-DC principals able to replicate password material without directly satisfying the goal to record directory service changes affecting privileged groups and policies.

E:

Signed LDAP exchanges protect authentication integrity but require compatible clients; it addresses the different need to reject unsigned directory binds that permit some relay or tampering risks, leaving the requested ability to record directory service changes affecting privileged groups and policies unresolved.

Certified Network Defender (312-38) Practice Tests