ECCouncil 312-38 (Certified Network Defender) Practice Test 24

Question 230

To authenticate remote desktop users before full graphical session creation, which practice addresses that objective?

  1. Protected Users group evaluation
  2. Kerberos preauthentication monitoring
  3. Privileged workstation separation
  4. Account lockout monitoring
  5. RDP Network Level Authentication

Explanation

Correct Answer

E:

NLA reduces resources exposed prior to authentication and relies on the supported credential flow; that is why it addresses the operational task to authenticate remote desktop users before full graphical session creation.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Membership restricts some authentication and credential caching patterns and may disrupt legacy dependencies; that is useful when the task is to reduce risky legacy credential behavior for highly sensitive domain accounts, not the stated requirement to authenticate remote desktop users before full graphical session creation.

B:

Domain controller event analysis reveals unusual authentication failure patterns in Kerberos flows; a team would select it to detect password attacks directed at domain accounts before ticket issuance, which does not provide the particular result to authenticate remote desktop users before full graphical session creation.

C:

A restricted administrative tier lowers exposure of high-value tokens to ordinary email or browsing activity; its operational purpose is to conduct domain administration only from a hardened dedicated device, not to achieve the specific requirement to authenticate remote desktop users before full graphical session creation.

D:

Aggregated authentication failure patterns reveal attempts while lockout policy requires denial-of-service consideration; applying it would serve find distributed guessing campaigns against employee Windows logons without directly satisfying the goal to authenticate remote desktop users before full graphical session creation.

Question 231

To find distributed guessing campaigns against employee Windows logons, which practice addresses that objective?

  1. Privileged workstation separation
  2. Account lockout monitoring
  3. Service account gMSA
  4. Kerberos preauthentication monitoring

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Aggregated authentication failure patterns reveal attempts while lockout policy requires denial-of-service consideration; its relevant protective or investigative effect is to find distributed guessing campaigns against employee Windows logons.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A restricted administrative tier lowers exposure of high-value tokens to ordinary email or browsing activity; it could help someone trying to conduct domain administration only from a hardened dedicated device, but the problem is instead to find distributed guessing campaigns against employee Windows logons.

C:

Group managed service accounts automate supported service secret rotation and SPN integration; a team would select it to avoid manually shared static passwords for domain services, which does not provide the particular result to find distributed guessing campaigns against employee Windows logons.

D:

Domain controller event analysis reveals unusual authentication failure patterns in Kerberos flows; its operational purpose is to detect password attacks directed at domain accounts before ticket issuance, not to achieve the specific requirement to find distributed guessing campaigns against employee Windows logons.

Question 232

To inspect files and execution for recognized malicious content, which tool, policy, or technique is appropriate?

  1. Windows SmartScreen reputation
  2. Windows Defender Firewall profiles
  3. Attack surface reduction rules
  4. Microsoft Defender Antivirus real-time protection

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Real-time scanning monitors activity with signatures and other detection mechanisms without guaranteeing perfect prevention; the requested outcome is precisely to inspect files and execution for recognized malicious content.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Reputation checks provide risk signals for web-delivered content beyond file extension filtering; although relevant to warn about downloaded applications with poor or unknown reputation, it does not by itself achieve the required task to inspect files and execution for recognized malicious content.

B:

Per-profile rules reflect interface trust context while enforcement remains on each host; it could help someone trying to apply different local network rules to domain, private and public contexts, but the problem is instead to inspect files and execution for recognized malicious content.

C:

ASR policies constrain specified high-risk actions based on behavior, not simply known malware hashes; that is useful when the task is to block suspicious Office child processes and credential theft behaviors, not the stated requirement to inspect files and execution for recognized malicious content.

Question 233

To block suspicious Office child processes and credential theft behaviors, what safeguard would be most applicable?

  1. Attack surface reduction rules
  2. Microsoft Defender Antivirus real-time protection
  3. Controlled folder access
  4. Windows Defender Application Control

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

ASR policies constrain specified high-risk actions based on behavior, not simply known malware hashes; this choice fits the scenario because the team must block suspicious Office child processes and credential theft behaviors.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Real-time scanning monitors activity with signatures and other detection mechanisms without guaranteeing perfect prevention; although relevant to inspect files and execution for recognized malicious content, it does not by itself achieve the required task to block suspicious Office child processes and credential theft behaviors.

C:

Protected-folder policy limits untrusted application modification attempts rather than replacing backups; it could help someone trying to reduce ransomware writes to protected user data directories, but the problem is instead to block suspicious Office child processes and credential theft behaviors.

D:

Application control enforces allowable code identities, limiting unsanctioned binaries and scripts; that is useful when the task is to restrict executable code according to publisher and signing trust policy, not the stated requirement to block suspicious Office child processes and credential theft behaviors.

Question 234

To apply different local network rules to domain, private and public contexts, what is the relevant defensive action?

  1. Windows Defender Firewall profiles
  2. Microsoft Defender Antivirus real-time protection
  3. Attack surface reduction rules
  4. Controlled folder access

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Per-profile rules reflect interface trust context while enforcement remains on each host; this mechanism directly supports the requirement to apply different local network rules to domain, private and public contexts.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Real-time scanning monitors activity with signatures and other detection mechanisms without guaranteeing perfect prevention; the outcome it supports is to inspect files and execution for recognized malicious content, whereas this scenario asks defenders to apply different local network rules to domain, private and public contexts.

C:

ASR policies constrain specified high-risk actions based on behavior, not simply known malware hashes; although relevant to block suspicious Office child processes and credential theft behaviors, it does not by itself achieve the required task to apply different local network rules to domain, private and public contexts.

D:

Protected-folder policy limits untrusted application modification attempts rather than replacing backups; it could help someone trying to reduce ransomware writes to protected user data directories, but the problem is instead to apply different local network rules to domain, private and public contexts.

Question 235

To warn about downloaded applications with poor or unknown reputation, which option most directly provides the capability?

  1. AppLocker rule scope
  2. Windows Defender Application Control
  3. Microsoft Defender Antivirus real-time protection
  4. Windows SmartScreen reputation
  5. Controlled folder access

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Reputation checks provide risk signals for web-delivered content beyond file extension filtering; it supplies the specific control needed to warn about downloaded applications with poor or unknown reputation.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Rule collections and user targeting provide application policy with administrative design considerations; the technique works for situations involving restrict which named user groups can execute designated application types, rather than this need to warn about downloaded applications with poor or unknown reputation.

B:

Application control enforces allowable code identities, limiting unsanctioned binaries and scripts; its mechanism supports restrict executable code according to publisher and signing trust policy, while the requested control must be able to warn about downloaded applications with poor or unknown reputation.

C:

Real-time scanning monitors activity with signatures and other detection mechanisms without guaranteeing perfect prevention; the outcome it supports is to inspect files and execution for recognized malicious content, whereas this scenario asks defenders to warn about downloaded applications with poor or unknown reputation.

E:

Protected-folder policy limits untrusted application modification attempts rather than replacing backups; it could help someone trying to reduce ransomware writes to protected user data directories, but the problem is instead to warn about downloaded applications with poor or unknown reputation.

Question 236

To restrict executable code according to publisher and signing trust policy, which control achieves the target outcome?

  1. AppLocker rule scope
  2. Windows Defender Firewall profiles
  3. Windows Defender Application Control
  4. Memory integrity HVCI

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Application control enforces allowable code identities, limiting unsanctioned binaries and scripts; that is why it addresses the operational task to restrict executable code according to publisher and signing trust policy.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Rule collections and user targeting provide application policy with administrative design considerations; it addresses the different need to restrict which named user groups can execute designated application types, leaving the requested ability to restrict executable code according to publisher and signing trust policy unresolved.

B:

Per-profile rules reflect interface trust context while enforcement remains on each host; the technique works for situations involving apply different local network rules to domain, private and public contexts, rather than this need to restrict executable code according to publisher and signing trust policy.

D:

Hypervisor-protected validation reduces opportunities for untrusted kernel code on supported hardware; the outcome it supports is to enforce stronger code-integrity checks for kernel-mode components, whereas this scenario asks defenders to restrict executable code according to publisher and signing trust policy.

Question 237

To restrict which named user groups can execute designated application types, which solution should be adopted?

  1. Memory integrity HVCI
  2. AppLocker rule scope
  3. Controlled folder access
  4. Windows Defender Firewall profiles

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Rule collections and user targeting provide application policy with administrative design considerations; its relevant protective or investigative effect is to restrict which named user groups can execute designated application types.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Hypervisor-protected validation reduces opportunities for untrusted kernel code on supported hardware; applying it would serve enforce stronger code-integrity checks for kernel-mode components without directly satisfying the goal to restrict which named user groups can execute designated application types.

C:

Protected-folder policy limits untrusted application modification attempts rather than replacing backups; the technique works for situations involving reduce ransomware writes to protected user data directories, rather than this need to restrict which named user groups can execute designated application types.

D:

Per-profile rules reflect interface trust context while enforcement remains on each host; its mechanism supports apply different local network rules to domain, private and public contexts, while the requested control must be able to restrict which named user groups can execute designated application types.

Question 238

To reduce ransomware writes to protected user data directories, which of the available controls is suitable?

  1. AppLocker rule scope
  2. Memory integrity HVCI
  3. Controlled folder access
  4. Tamper protection

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Protected-folder policy limits untrusted application modification attempts rather than replacing backups; the requested outcome is precisely to reduce ransomware writes to protected user data directories.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Rule collections and user targeting provide application policy with administrative design considerations; its operational purpose is to restrict which named user groups can execute designated application types, not to achieve the specific requirement to reduce ransomware writes to protected user data directories.

B:

Hypervisor-protected validation reduces opportunities for untrusted kernel code on supported hardware; applying it would serve enforce stronger code-integrity checks for kernel-mode components without directly satisfying the goal to reduce ransomware writes to protected user data directories.

D:

Self-protection restricts modification of security configuration through common local tampering paths; the technique works for situations involving prevent unauthorized changes to endpoint security settings, rather than this need to reduce ransomware writes to protected user data directories.

Question 239

To enforce stronger code-integrity checks for kernel-mode components, which option is the direct technical match?

  1. Memory integrity HVCI
  2. AppLocker rule scope
  3. Tamper protection
  4. Exploit protection policies

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Hypervisor-protected validation reduces opportunities for untrusted kernel code on supported hardware; this choice fits the scenario because the team must enforce stronger code-integrity checks for kernel-mode components.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Rule collections and user targeting provide application policy with administrative design considerations; its operational purpose is to restrict which named user groups can execute designated application types, not to achieve the specific requirement to enforce stronger code-integrity checks for kernel-mode components.

C:

Self-protection restricts modification of security configuration through common local tampering paths; applying it would serve prevent unauthorized changes to endpoint security settings without directly satisfying the goal to enforce stronger code-integrity checks for kernel-mode components.

D:

System and per-program rules enable protective features but cannot substitute for patching flaws; it addresses the different need to apply process mitigations against memory corruption and exploit techniques, leaving the requested ability to enforce stronger code-integrity checks for kernel-mode components unresolved.

Question 240

To apply process mitigations against memory corruption and exploit techniques and to prevent unauthorized changes to endpoint security settings, which TWO measures should the defender select? Choose TWO.

  1. Windows Defender Application Control
  2. Exploit protection policies
  3. Memory integrity HVCI
  4. Device Control policies
  5. Tamper protection

Explanation

Correct Answers

B:

System and per-program rules enable protective features but cannot substitute for patching flaws; this is the measure that can apply process mitigations against memory corruption and exploit techniques as one of the separately stated outcomes.

E:

Self-protection restricts modification of security configuration through common local tampering paths; this is the measure that can prevent unauthorized changes to endpoint security settings as one of the separately stated outcomes.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Application control enforces allowable code identities, limiting unsanctioned binaries and scripts; that is useful when the task is to restrict executable code according to publisher and signing trust policy, not the stated requirement to apply process mitigations against memory corruption and exploit techniques and to prevent unauthorized changes to endpoint security settings.

C:

Hypervisor-protected validation reduces opportunities for untrusted kernel code on supported hardware; its operational purpose is to enforce stronger code-integrity checks for kernel-mode components, not to achieve the specific requirement to apply process mitigations against memory corruption and exploit techniques and to prevent unauthorized changes to endpoint security settings.

D:

Class- or device-aware rules can limit data transfer and unsafe peripheral use at the endpoint; applying it would serve restrict use of removable storage on managed Windows systems without directly satisfying the goal to apply process mitigations against memory corruption and exploit techniques and to prevent unauthorized changes to endpoint security settings.

Certified Network Defender (312-38) Practice Tests