ECCouncil 312-38 (Certified Network Defender) Practice Test 27

Question 260

To record directory service changes affecting privileged groups and policies, which of the available controls is suitable?

  1. AdminSDHolder ACL review
  2. Domain controller auditing
  3. LDAP channel binding
  4. DCSync rights audit
  5. LDAP signing enforcement

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Audited changes provide evidence of who modified sensitive AD objects and when; that is why it addresses the operational task to record directory service changes affecting privileged groups and policies.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Protected-object ACL templates can reapply unauthorized grants unless their source is corrected; that is useful when the task is to detect persistent permissions on protected privileged accounts, not the stated requirement to record directory service changes affecting privileged groups and policies.

C:

Channel binding ties authentication to the protected TLS session where clients support it; its operational purpose is to reduce credential relay against directory TLS endpoints, not to achieve the specific requirement to record directory service changes affecting privileged groups and policies.

D:

Replication permissions can expose directory secrets without interactive login to a domain controller; applying it would serve identify non-DC principals able to replicate password material without directly satisfying the goal to record directory service changes affecting privileged groups and policies.

E:

Signed LDAP exchanges protect authentication integrity but require compatible clients; it addresses the different need to reject unsigned directory binds that permit some relay or tampering risks, leaving the requested ability to record directory service changes affecting privileged groups and policies unresolved.

Question 261

To find a high-risk policy unexpectedly linked to a broad organizational unit, which option is the direct technical match?

  1. GPO link review
  2. AdminSDHolder ACL review
  3. LAPS read permission review
  4. Domain controller auditing

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Scope of management, links and security filtering determine which machines receive policy; its relevant protective or investigative effect is to find a high-risk policy unexpectedly linked to a broad organizational unit.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Protected-object ACL templates can reapply unauthorized grants unless their source is corrected; that is useful when the task is to detect persistent permissions on protected privileged accounts, not the stated requirement to find a high-risk policy unexpectedly linked to a broad organizational unit.

C:

Secret read rights should be narrower than ordinary directory object read access; a team would select it to limit who can retrieve workstation local administrative passwords, which does not provide the particular result to find a high-risk policy unexpectedly linked to a broad organizational unit.

D:

Audited changes provide evidence of who modified sensitive AD objects and when; its operational purpose is to record directory service changes affecting privileged groups and policies, not to achieve the specific requirement to find a high-risk policy unexpectedly linked to a broad organizational unit.

Question 262

To limit who can retrieve workstation local administrative passwords, which approach should a Windows endpoint administrator choose?

  1. Kerberos delegation audit
  2. Domain controller auditing
  3. GPO link review
  4. LAPS read permission review

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Secret read rights should be narrower than ordinary directory object read access; the requested outcome is precisely to limit who can retrieve workstation local administrative passwords.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Delegation settings can let a service impersonate clients; restrictive configuration limits abuse; although relevant to remove unnecessary unrestricted delegation from service accounts, it does not by itself achieve the required task to limit who can retrieve workstation local administrative passwords.

B:

Audited changes provide evidence of who modified sensitive AD objects and when; it could help someone trying to record directory service changes affecting privileged groups and policies, but the problem is instead to limit who can retrieve workstation local administrative passwords.

C:

Scope of management, links and security filtering determine which machines receive policy; that is useful when the task is to find a high-risk policy unexpectedly linked to a broad organizational unit, not the stated requirement to limit who can retrieve workstation local administrative passwords.

Question 263

To identify non-DC principals able to replicate password material, which method is designed for the task?

  1. Domain controller auditing
  2. AD CS template review
  3. DCSync rights audit
  4. GPO link review

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Replication permissions can expose directory secrets without interactive login to a domain controller; this choice fits the scenario because the team must identify non-DC principals able to replicate password material.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Audited changes provide evidence of who modified sensitive AD objects and when; the outcome it supports is to record directory service changes affecting privileged groups and policies, whereas this scenario asks defenders to identify non-DC principals able to replicate password material.

B:

Template permissions and subject-name rules can create impersonation paths independent of password strength; although relevant to identify certificate enrollment templates permitting dangerous identity claims, it does not by itself achieve the required task to identify non-DC principals able to replicate password material.

D:

Scope of management, links and security filtering determine which machines receive policy; that is useful when the task is to find a high-risk policy unexpectedly linked to a broad organizational unit, not the stated requirement to identify non-DC principals able to replicate password material.

Question 264

To limit who can retrieve workstation local administrative passwords, to identify non-DC principals able to replicate password material, and to invalidate potentially abused Kerberos ticket-granting secrets after compromise, which THREE measures should the team select? Choose THREE.

  1. KRBTGT reset planning
  2. DCSync rights audit
  3. LAPS read permission review
  4. Domain controller auditing
  5. GPO link review
  6. AD CS template review

Explanation

Correct Answers

A:

Coordinated key rotation affects ticket trust and requires careful sequencing to avoid authentication disruption; this is the measure that can invalidate potentially abused Kerberos ticket-granting secrets after compromise as one of the separately stated outcomes.

B:

Replication permissions can expose directory secrets without interactive login to a domain controller; this is the measure that can identify non-DC principals able to replicate password material as one of the separately stated outcomes.

C:

Secret read rights should be narrower than ordinary directory object read access; this is the measure that can limit who can retrieve workstation local administrative passwords as one of the separately stated outcomes.

Incorrect Answers

D:

Audited changes provide evidence of who modified sensitive AD objects and when; it could help someone trying to record directory service changes affecting privileged groups and policies, but the problem is instead to limit who can retrieve workstation local administrative passwords, to identify non-DC principals able to replicate password material, and to invalidate potentially abused Kerberos ticket-granting secrets after compromise.

E:

Scope of management, links and security filtering determine which machines receive policy; that is useful when the task is to find a high-risk policy unexpectedly linked to a broad organizational unit, not the stated requirement to limit who can retrieve workstation local administrative passwords, to identify non-DC principals able to replicate password material, and to invalidate potentially abused Kerberos ticket-granting secrets after compromise.

F:

Template permissions and subject-name rules can create impersonation paths independent of password strength; a team would select it to identify certificate enrollment templates permitting dangerous identity claims, which does not provide the particular result to limit who can retrieve workstation local administrative passwords, to identify non-DC principals able to replicate password material, and to invalidate potentially abused Kerberos ticket-granting secrets after compromise.

Question 265

To investigate repeated failed interactive or network logon attempts, what technique should the team use?

  1. Windows Event ID 4625 analysis
  2. Sysmon process event correlation
  3. System Restore limitation
  4. Windows Event ID 4672 review
  5. Windows Event ID 4688 auditing

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Security log failures include account and logon context useful for separating mistyped passwords from attacks; it supplies the specific control needed to investigate repeated failed interactive or network logon attempts.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Sysmon event streams provide enriched process and network observability when properly configured; its mechanism supports investigate a suspicious executable with process hashes and ancestry, while the requested control must be able to investigate repeated failed interactive or network logon attempts.

C:

Restore points can be deleted or compromised and do not replace tested offline backups; the outcome it supports is to avoid treating a restore point as a reliable recovery from destructive ransomware, whereas this scenario asks defenders to investigate repeated failed interactive or network logon attempts.

D:

Special-privilege logon events highlight elevated token assignments when audit policy captures them; although relevant to identify sessions receiving sensitive administrative privileges, it does not by itself achieve the required task to investigate repeated failed interactive or network logon attempts.

E:

Process creation records relate executables to parent context when command-line inclusion is configured; it could help someone trying to trace suspicious process creation and command-line behavior, but the problem is instead to investigate repeated failed interactive or network logon attempts.

Question 266

To identify sessions receiving sensitive administrative privileges, which protective or investigative measure applies?

  1. Windows Event ID 4688 auditing
  2. Windows Event ID 4672 review
  3. Windows Event ID 4625 analysis
  4. Defender isolation action
  5. VSS snapshot controls
  6. Sysmon process event correlation

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Special-privilege logon events highlight elevated token assignments when audit policy captures them; that is why it addresses the operational task to identify sessions receiving sensitive administrative privileges.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Process creation records relate executables to parent context when command-line inclusion is configured; it addresses the different need to trace suspicious process creation and command-line behavior, leaving the requested ability to identify sessions receiving sensitive administrative privileges unresolved.

C:

Security log failures include account and logon context useful for separating mistyped passwords from attacks; its mechanism supports investigate repeated failed interactive or network logon attempts, while the requested control must be able to identify sessions receiving sensitive administrative privileges.

D:

EDR-mediated network containment reduces spread yet permits designated management communication; the outcome it supports is to disconnect a suspected compromised workstation while preserving investigation options, whereas this scenario asks defenders to identify sessions receiving sensitive administrative privileges.

E:

Monitoring snapshot destruction helps identify ransomware preparation before recovery options disappear; although relevant to detect hostile deletion of shadow copies after malicious execution, it does not by itself achieve the required task to identify sessions receiving sensitive administrative privileges.

F:

Sysmon event streams provide enriched process and network observability when properly configured; it could help someone trying to investigate a suspicious executable with process hashes and ancestry, but the problem is instead to identify sessions receiving sensitive administrative privileges.

Question 267

To trace suspicious process creation and command-line behavior, what is the most direct option?

  1. Windows Event ID 4625 analysis
  2. Windows Event ID 4688 auditing
  3. VSS snapshot controls
  4. System Restore limitation

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Process creation records relate executables to parent context when command-line inclusion is configured; its relevant protective or investigative effect is to trace suspicious process creation and command-line behavior.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Security log failures include account and logon context useful for separating mistyped passwords from attacks; applying it would serve investigate repeated failed interactive or network logon attempts without directly satisfying the goal to trace suspicious process creation and command-line behavior.

C:

Monitoring snapshot destruction helps identify ransomware preparation before recovery options disappear; the technique works for situations involving detect hostile deletion of shadow copies after malicious execution, rather than this need to trace suspicious process creation and command-line behavior.

D:

Restore points can be deleted or compromised and do not replace tested offline backups; its mechanism supports avoid treating a restore point as a reliable recovery from destructive ransomware, while the requested control must be able to trace suspicious process creation and command-line behavior.

Question 268

To investigate a suspicious executable with process hashes and ancestry, what should defenders select?

  1. Sysmon process event correlation
  2. Defender isolation action
  3. System Restore limitation
  4. Windows Event ID 4625 analysis

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Sysmon event streams provide enriched process and network observability when properly configured; the requested outcome is precisely to investigate a suspicious executable with process hashes and ancestry.

Incorrect Answers

B:

EDR-mediated network containment reduces spread yet permits designated management communication; applying it would serve disconnect a suspected compromised workstation while preserving investigation options without directly satisfying the goal to investigate a suspicious executable with process hashes and ancestry.

C:

Restore points can be deleted or compromised and do not replace tested offline backups; it addresses the different need to avoid treating a restore point as a reliable recovery from destructive ransomware, leaving the requested ability to investigate a suspicious executable with process hashes and ancestry unresolved.

D:

Security log failures include account and logon context useful for separating mistyped passwords from attacks; the technique works for situations involving investigate repeated failed interactive or network logon attempts, rather than this need to investigate a suspicious executable with process hashes and ancestry.

Question 269

To disconnect a suspected compromised workstation while preserving investigation options, which mechanism best fits?

  1. VSS snapshot controls
  2. Defender isolation action
  3. System Restore limitation
  4. Windows Event ID 4625 analysis

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

EDR-mediated network containment reduces spread yet permits designated management communication; this choice fits the scenario because the team must disconnect a suspected compromised workstation while preserving investigation options.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Monitoring snapshot destruction helps identify ransomware preparation before recovery options disappear; a team would select it to detect hostile deletion of shadow copies after malicious execution, which does not provide the particular result to disconnect a suspected compromised workstation while preserving investigation options.

C:

Restore points can be deleted or compromised and do not replace tested offline backups; applying it would serve avoid treating a restore point as a reliable recovery from destructive ransomware without directly satisfying the goal to disconnect a suspected compromised workstation while preserving investigation options.

D:

Security log failures include account and logon context useful for separating mistyped passwords from attacks; it addresses the different need to investigate repeated failed interactive or network logon attempts, leaving the requested ability to disconnect a suspected compromised workstation while preserving investigation options unresolved.

Question 270

To avoid treating a restore point as a reliable recovery from destructive ransomware, which measure best meets the requirement?

  1. Windows Event ID 4688 auditing
  2. System Restore limitation
  3. Windows Firewall log review
  4. Defender isolation action
  5. VSS snapshot controls

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Restore points can be deleted or compromised and do not replace tested offline backups; this mechanism directly supports the requirement to avoid treating a restore point as a reliable recovery from destructive ransomware.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Process creation records relate executables to parent context when command-line inclusion is configured; that is useful when the task is to trace suspicious process creation and command-line behavior, not the stated requirement to avoid treating a restore point as a reliable recovery from destructive ransomware.

C:

Host filtering logs distinguish endpoint policy drops from perimeter network failures; its operational purpose is to explain why a particular inbound TCP connection was blocked locally, not to achieve the specific requirement to avoid treating a restore point as a reliable recovery from destructive ransomware.

D:

EDR-mediated network containment reduces spread yet permits designated management communication; applying it would serve disconnect a suspected compromised workstation while preserving investigation options without directly satisfying the goal to avoid treating a restore point as a reliable recovery from destructive ransomware.

E:

Monitoring snapshot destruction helps identify ransomware preparation before recovery options disappear; it addresses the different need to detect hostile deletion of shadow copies after malicious execution, leaving the requested ability to avoid treating a restore point as a reliable recovery from destructive ransomware unresolved.

Certified Network Defender (312-38) Practice Tests