Question 660
To remove stale DNS, tokens and storage after deleting an application VM, what should defenders select?
- Cloud certificate lifecycle
- Cloud firewall policy inheritance
- Cloud egress cost anomaly
- Cloud service decommissioning
- Cloud incident snapshot preservation
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Closure covers dependent resources and identities that outlive the main compute instance; this mechanism directly supports the requirement to remove stale DNS, tokens and storage after deleting an application VM.
Incorrect Answers
A:Renewal monitoring and deployment validation maintain encrypted trust for user sessions; that is useful when the task is to avoid unexpected TLS downtime on public application endpoints, not the stated requirement to remove stale DNS, tokens and storage after deleting an application VM.
B:Hierarchical policy enforcement depends on organization and resource-level semantics for each provider; a team would select it to verify centrally mandated restrictions apply to child cloud projects, which does not provide the particular result to remove stale DNS, tokens and storage after deleting an application VM.
C:Transfer metrics can supplement security analytics for suspected data exfiltration; its operational purpose is to detect unusual outbound transfer volumes from an application account, not to achieve the specific requirement to remove stale DNS, tokens and storage after deleting an application VM.
E:Forensic copies protect investigative state while containment and credential revocation proceed; it addresses the different need to retain disk evidence before rebuilding a compromised virtual server, leaving the requested ability to remove stale DNS, tokens and storage after deleting an application VM unresolved.
Question 661
To replace shared-key handshake behavior susceptible to offline dictionary capture, which mechanism best fits?
- WPA3-Personal SAE
- RADIUS shared-secret rotation
- PEAP server validation
- EAP-TLS authentication
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Simultaneous Authentication of Equals resists passive password-guess verification from a captured handshake; it supplies the specific control needed to replace shared-key handshake behavior susceptible to offline dictionary capture.
Incorrect Answers
B:New secrets secure affected RADIUS relationships while modern transport protection and policy are considered; that is useful when the task is to replace a leaked WLAN access-point-to-AAA secret, not the stated requirement to replace shared-key handshake behavior susceptible to offline dictionary capture.
C:Validating the authentication server certificate and expected name prevents common evil-twin credential theft paths; a team would select it to stop staff credentials going to a counterfeit RADIUS endpoint, which does not provide the particular result to replace shared-key handshake behavior susceptible to offline dictionary capture.
D:Client and server certificates reduce dependence on user passwords when private keys and PKI are protected; its operational purpose is to require certificate-backed mutual authentication for managed Wi-Fi clients, not to achieve the specific requirement to replace shared-key handshake behavior susceptible to offline dictionary capture.
Question 662
To authenticate individual staff using centralized enterprise WLAN identities, which measure best meets the requirement?
- WPA3-Enterprise 802.1X
- WPA2-Enterprise migration
- PEAP server validation
- WPA3-Personal SAE
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:EAP-based admission supports per-user credentials and policy under a validated authentication server; that is why it addresses the operational task to authenticate individual staff using centralized enterprise WLAN identities.
Incorrect Answers
B:Individual 802.1X identities improve revocation and attribution relative to one shared passphrase; it could help someone trying to move a legacy shared-password WLAN toward per-user authentication, but the problem is instead to authenticate individual staff using centralized enterprise WLAN identities.
C:Validating the authentication server certificate and expected name prevents common evil-twin credential theft paths; that is useful when the task is to stop staff credentials going to a counterfeit RADIUS endpoint, not the stated requirement to authenticate individual staff using centralized enterprise WLAN identities.
D:Simultaneous Authentication of Equals resists passive password-guess verification from a captured handshake; a team would select it to replace shared-key handshake behavior susceptible to offline dictionary capture, which does not provide the particular result to authenticate individual staff using centralized enterprise WLAN identities.
Question 663
To require certificate-backed mutual authentication for managed Wi-Fi clients, what control should be selected?
- RADIUS shared-secret rotation
- WPA3-Personal SAE
- EAP-TLS authentication
- WPA3 transition mode risk
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Client and server certificates reduce dependence on user passwords when private keys and PKI are protected; its relevant protective or investigative effect is to require certificate-backed mutual authentication for managed Wi-Fi clients.
Incorrect Answers
A:New secrets secure affected RADIUS relationships while modern transport protection and policy are considered; the outcome it supports is to replace a leaked WLAN access-point-to-AAA secret, whereas this scenario asks defenders to require certificate-backed mutual authentication for managed Wi-Fi clients.
B:Simultaneous Authentication of Equals resists passive password-guess verification from a captured handshake; although relevant to replace shared-key handshake behavior susceptible to offline dictionary capture, it does not by itself achieve the required task to require certificate-backed mutual authentication for managed Wi-Fi clients.
D:Mixed-mode compatibility permits older clients and may retain weaker behaviors until they are phased out; that is useful when the task is to assess whether allowing legacy WPA2 association weakens an otherwise upgraded SSID, not the stated requirement to require certificate-backed mutual authentication for managed Wi-Fi clients.
Question 664
To stop staff credentials going to a counterfeit RADIUS endpoint, which security control is most appropriate?
- WPA3-Enterprise 802.1X
- RADIUS shared-secret rotation
- PEAP server validation
- EAP-TLS authentication
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Validating the authentication server certificate and expected name prevents common evil-twin credential theft paths; the requested outcome is precisely to stop staff credentials going to a counterfeit RADIUS endpoint.
Incorrect Answers
A:EAP-based admission supports per-user credentials and policy under a validated authentication server; its mechanism supports authenticate individual staff using centralized enterprise WLAN identities, while the requested control must be able to stop staff credentials going to a counterfeit RADIUS endpoint.
B:New secrets secure affected RADIUS relationships while modern transport protection and policy are considered; the outcome it supports is to replace a leaked WLAN access-point-to-AAA secret, whereas this scenario asks defenders to stop staff credentials going to a counterfeit RADIUS endpoint.
D:Client and server certificates reduce dependence on user passwords when private keys and PKI are protected; it could help someone trying to require certificate-backed mutual authentication for managed Wi-Fi clients, but the problem is instead to stop staff credentials going to a counterfeit RADIUS endpoint.
Question 665
To replace a leaked WLAN access-point-to-AAA secret, what would a wireless security engineer implement or use?
- WPA3 transition mode risk
- RADIUS shared-secret rotation
- EAP-TLS authentication
- PEAP server validation
- 802.1X dynamic VLAN assignment
- Certificate revocation on WLAN
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:New secrets secure affected RADIUS relationships while modern transport protection and policy are considered; this choice fits the scenario because the team must replace a leaked WLAN access-point-to-AAA secret.
Incorrect Answers
A:Mixed-mode compatibility permits older clients and may retain weaker behaviors until they are phased out; the technique works for situations involving assess whether allowing legacy WPA2 association weakens an otherwise upgraded SSID, rather than this need to replace a leaked WLAN access-point-to-AAA secret.
C:Client and server certificates reduce dependence on user passwords when private keys and PKI are protected; the outcome it supports is to require certificate-backed mutual authentication for managed Wi-Fi clients, whereas this scenario asks defenders to replace a leaked WLAN access-point-to-AAA secret.
D:Validating the authentication server certificate and expected name prevents common evil-twin credential theft paths; although relevant to stop staff credentials going to a counterfeit RADIUS endpoint, it does not by itself achieve the required task to replace a leaked WLAN access-point-to-AAA secret.
E:RADIUS authorization attributes can assign VLAN policy after authentication; it could help someone trying to place employees and contractors into separate segments on the same SSID, but the problem is instead to replace a leaked WLAN access-point-to-AAA secret.
F:PKI revocation removes individual certificate trust when supplicants and servers enforce status policy; that is useful when the task is to deny a compromised laptop identity without rotating every user's password, not the stated requirement to replace a leaked WLAN access-point-to-AAA secret.
Question 666
To move a legacy shared-password WLAN toward per-user authentication, which practice addresses that objective?
- WPA3 transition mode risk
- Wireless guest captive portal
- WPA2-Enterprise migration
- 802.1X dynamic VLAN assignment
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Individual 802.1X identities improve revocation and attribution relative to one shared passphrase; this mechanism directly supports the requirement to move a legacy shared-password WLAN toward per-user authentication.
Incorrect Answers
A:Mixed-mode compatibility permits older clients and may retain weaker behaviors until they are phased out; it addresses the different need to assess whether allowing legacy WPA2 association weakens an otherwise upgraded SSID, leaving the requested ability to move a legacy shared-password WLAN toward per-user authentication unresolved.
B:Portal flows govern usage but are not a substitute for encrypted link protection or segmentation; the technique works for situations involving collect guest agreement before offering limited internet connectivity, rather than this need to move a legacy shared-password WLAN toward per-user authentication.
D:RADIUS authorization attributes can assign VLAN policy after authentication; the outcome it supports is to place employees and contractors into separate segments on the same SSID, whereas this scenario asks defenders to move a legacy shared-password WLAN toward per-user authentication.
Question 667
To assess whether allowing legacy WPA2 association weakens an otherwise upgraded SSID, which tool, policy, or technique is appropriate?
- WPA3-Enterprise 802.1X
- Certificate revocation on WLAN
- WPA3 transition mode risk
- WPA2-Enterprise migration
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Mixed-mode compatibility permits older clients and may retain weaker behaviors until they are phased out; it supplies the specific control needed to assess whether allowing legacy WPA2 association weakens an otherwise upgraded SSID.
Incorrect Answers
A:EAP-based admission supports per-user credentials and policy under a validated authentication server; applying it would serve authenticate individual staff using centralized enterprise WLAN identities without directly satisfying the goal to assess whether allowing legacy WPA2 association weakens an otherwise upgraded SSID.
B:PKI revocation removes individual certificate trust when supplicants and servers enforce status policy; it addresses the different need to deny a compromised laptop identity without rotating every user's password, leaving the requested ability to assess whether allowing legacy WPA2 association weakens an otherwise upgraded SSID unresolved.
D:Individual 802.1X identities improve revocation and attribution relative to one shared passphrase; its mechanism supports move a legacy shared-password WLAN toward per-user authentication, while the requested control must be able to assess whether allowing legacy WPA2 association weakens an otherwise upgraded SSID.
Question 668
To place employees and contractors into separate segments on the same SSID and to deny a compromised laptop identity without rotating every user's password, which TWO measures should the defender select? Choose TWO.
- Certificate revocation on WLAN
- 802.1X dynamic VLAN assignment
- WPA2-Enterprise migration
- WPA3 transition mode risk
- Wireless guest captive portal
Explanation
Correct Answers
A:PKI revocation removes individual certificate trust when supplicants and servers enforce status policy; it satisfies the distinct requirement to deny a compromised laptop identity without rotating every user's password within the multi-control task.
B:RADIUS authorization attributes can assign VLAN policy after authentication; it satisfies the distinct requirement to place employees and contractors into separate segments on the same SSID within the multi-control task.
Incorrect Answers
C:Individual 802.1X identities improve revocation and attribution relative to one shared passphrase; it addresses the different need to move a legacy shared-password WLAN toward per-user authentication, leaving the requested ability to place employees and contractors into separate segments on the same SSID and to deny a compromised laptop identity without rotating every user's password unresolved.
D:Mixed-mode compatibility permits older clients and may retain weaker behaviors until they are phased out; the technique works for situations involving assess whether allowing legacy WPA2 association weakens an otherwise upgraded SSID, rather than this need to place employees and contractors into separate segments on the same SSID and to deny a compromised laptop identity without rotating every user's password.
E:Portal flows govern usage but are not a substitute for encrypted link protection or segmentation; its mechanism supports collect guest agreement before offering limited internet connectivity, while the requested control must be able to place employees and contractors into separate segments on the same SSID and to deny a compromised laptop identity without rotating every user's password.
Question 669
A compromised laptop has already been blocked in the network access control policy, but its authenticated 802.1X WLAN connection remains active. The team needs the wireless infrastructure to disconnect that existing session immediately instead of waiting for reassociation. Which capability applies?
- RADIUS Change of Authorization or Disconnect-Request
- Rotate the RADIUS shared secret on every access point
- Enable WPA3 transition mode
- Wait for the client certificate to expire
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:RADIUS Dynamic Authorization supports CoA and Disconnect-Request messages that compatible network access devices can use to alter or end an existing authenticated session. This enforces an updated NAC decision without waiting for a normal reconnect.
Incorrect Answers
B:Rotating the RADIUS shared secret changes authentication between network access devices and the RADIUS service. It is disruptive to shared infrastructure and does not selectively end one already authorized client session.
C:WPA3 transition mode supports compatibility between different client security capabilities. It does not implement live administrative termination of one identified, already authenticated wireless session.
D:Waiting for certificate expiry leaves the compromised endpoint connected until a separate event ends the session. A certificate-lifecycle event does not provide the immediate active-session control specified here.
Question 670
To collect guest agreement before offering limited internet connectivity, which option most directly provides the capability?
- 802.1X dynamic VLAN assignment
- Wireless onboarding workflow
- RADIUS shared-secret rotation
- Certificate revocation on WLAN
- Wireless guest captive portal
Explanation
Correct Answer
E:Portal flows govern usage but are not a substitute for encrypted link protection or segmentation; the requested outcome is precisely to collect guest agreement before offering limited internet connectivity.
Incorrect Answers
A:RADIUS authorization attributes can assign VLAN policy after authentication; that is useful when the task is to place employees and contractors into separate segments on the same SSID, not the stated requirement to collect guest agreement before offering limited internet connectivity.
B:Controlled enrollment distributes unique identities and configures trusted EAP profiles; a team would select it to issue managed device certificates without sharing an office-wide PSK, which does not provide the particular result to collect guest agreement before offering limited internet connectivity.
C:New secrets secure affected RADIUS relationships while modern transport protection and policy are considered; its operational purpose is to replace a leaked WLAN access-point-to-AAA secret, not to achieve the specific requirement to collect guest agreement before offering limited internet connectivity.
D:PKI revocation removes individual certificate trust when supplicants and servers enforce status policy; applying it would serve deny a compromised laptop identity without rotating every user's password without directly satisfying the goal to collect guest agreement before offering limited internet connectivity.