ECCouncil 312-38 (Certified Network Defender) Practice Test 45

Question 440

To remove sensors that cannot meet ongoing encryption and update requirements, what safeguard would be most applicable?

  1. Certificate expiration monitoring
  2. NIST IoT device capability assessment
  3. Protocol gateway patch review
  4. IEC 62443 zone review
  5. Device EOL replacement plan

Explanation

Correct Answer

E:

Scheduled retirement closes unsupported exposures instead of assuming temporary network isolation will last forever; that is why it addresses the operational task to remove sensors that cannot meet ongoing encryption and update requirements.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Lifecycle alerting enables staged renewal before an authentication outage occurs; that is useful when the task is to prevent a remote fleet from losing broker access simultaneously when credentials expire, not the stated requirement to remove sensors that cannot meet ongoing encryption and update requirements.

B:

Capability-oriented evaluation tests whether the product can meet organizational cybersecurity expectations; a team would select it to check whether a purchased sensor supports identity, updates and secure storage, which does not provide the particular result to remove sensors that cannot meet ongoing encryption and update requirements.

C:

Gateway updates deserve prioritization because compromise can bridge multiple device groups; its operational purpose is to find which shared hub exposes several otherwise isolated sensor networks, not to achieve the specific requirement to remove sensors that cannot meet ongoing encryption and update requirements.

D:

Zones and conduits express trust boundaries suited to industrial automation environments; applying it would serve separate industrial assets according to security levels and permitted conduits without directly satisfying the goal to remove sensors that cannot meet ongoing encryption and update requirements.

Question 441

To permit only approved applications to execute on managed workstations, what is the relevant defensive action?

  1. Application denylisting
  2. Application allowlist policy
  3. Hash-based application rules
  4. Script interpreter restriction

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Positive identity rules block unknown software even when its hash is not in a malware signature database; its relevant protective or investigative effect is to permit only approved applications to execute on managed workstations.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Negative lists stop identified software but do not prevent execution of unknown unwanted programs; it could help someone trying to block a known unwanted tool while leaving other applications generally permitted, but the problem is instead to permit only approved applications to execute on managed workstations.

C:

File digest rules tightly bind authorization to bytes but must be updated after legitimate revisions; a team would select it to allow one exact audited binary while rejecting modified versions, which does not provide the particular result to permit only approved applications to execute on managed workstations.

D:

Execution policy must consider scripting engines and command shells, not only packaged executables; its operational purpose is to prevent users from launching unapproved interpreter-hosted payloads, not to achieve the specific requirement to permit only approved applications to execute on managed workstations.

Question 442

To admit signed vendor updates without reauthorizing each changing file hash, which option most directly provides the capability?

  1. Application denylisting
  2. Publisher-based allowlisting
  3. Hash-based application rules
  4. Script interpreter restriction

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Trusted signer rules ease version maintenance but require careful publisher and scope selection; the requested outcome is precisely to admit signed vendor updates without reauthorizing each changing file hash.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Negative lists stop identified software but do not prevent execution of unknown unwanted programs; although relevant to block a known unwanted tool while leaving other applications generally permitted, it does not by itself achieve the required task to admit signed vendor updates without reauthorizing each changing file hash.

C:

File digest rules tightly bind authorization to bytes but must be updated after legitimate revisions; that is useful when the task is to allow one exact audited binary while rejecting modified versions, not the stated requirement to admit signed vendor updates without reauthorizing each changing file hash.

D:

Execution policy must consider scripting engines and command shells, not only packaged executables; a team would select it to prevent users from launching unapproved interpreter-hosted payloads, which does not provide the particular result to admit signed vendor updates without reauthorizing each changing file hash.

Question 443

To allow one exact audited binary while rejecting modified versions, which control achieves the target outcome?

  1. Application denylisting
  2. Script interpreter restriction
  3. Hash-based application rules
  4. Privilege-restricted application

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

File digest rules tightly bind authorization to bytes but must be updated after legitimate revisions; this choice fits the scenario because the team must allow one exact audited binary while rejecting modified versions.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Negative lists stop identified software but do not prevent execution of unknown unwanted programs; the outcome it supports is to block a known unwanted tool while leaving other applications generally permitted, whereas this scenario asks defenders to allow one exact audited binary while rejecting modified versions.

B:

Execution policy must consider scripting engines and command shells, not only packaged executables; although relevant to prevent users from launching unapproved interpreter-hosted payloads, it does not by itself achieve the required task to allow one exact audited binary while rejecting modified versions.

D:

Least-privilege execution limits damage from compromise while preserving needed user functions; that is useful when the task is to run an externally supplied utility without local administrator rights, not the stated requirement to allow one exact audited binary while rejecting modified versions.

Question 444

To block a known unwanted tool while leaving other applications generally permitted, which solution should be adopted?

  1. Script interpreter restriction
  2. Application denylisting
  3. Library loading control
  4. Hash-based application rules

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Negative lists stop identified software but do not prevent execution of unknown unwanted programs; this mechanism directly supports the requirement to block a known unwanted tool while leaving other applications generally permitted.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Execution policy must consider scripting engines and command shells, not only packaged executables; its mechanism supports prevent users from launching unapproved interpreter-hosted payloads, while the requested control must be able to block a known unwanted tool while leaving other applications generally permitted.

C:

Search-path and dependency restrictions address sideloading even when the main executable is approved; although relevant to prevent signed applications from importing untrusted local DLLs, it does not by itself achieve the required task to block a known unwanted tool while leaving other applications generally permitted.

D:

File digest rules tightly bind authorization to bytes but must be updated after legitimate revisions; it could help someone trying to allow one exact audited binary while rejecting modified versions, but the problem is instead to block a known unwanted tool while leaving other applications generally permitted.

Question 445

To prevent users from launching unapproved interpreter-hosted payloads, which of the available controls is suitable?

  1. Script interpreter restriction
  2. Application denylisting
  3. Library loading control
  4. Privilege-restricted application
  5. Package repository allowlist

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Execution policy must consider scripting engines and command shells, not only packaged executables; it supplies the specific control needed to prevent users from launching unapproved interpreter-hosted payloads.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Negative lists stop identified software but do not prevent execution of unknown unwanted programs; its mechanism supports block a known unwanted tool while leaving other applications generally permitted, while the requested control must be able to prevent users from launching unapproved interpreter-hosted payloads.

C:

Search-path and dependency restrictions address sideloading even when the main executable is approved; the outcome it supports is to prevent signed applications from importing untrusted local DLLs, whereas this scenario asks defenders to prevent users from launching unapproved interpreter-hosted payloads.

D:

Least-privilege execution limits damage from compromise while preserving needed user functions; although relevant to run an externally supplied utility without local administrator rights, it does not by itself achieve the required task to prevent users from launching unapproved interpreter-hosted payloads.

E:

Approved sources and integrity validation restrict dependency supply-chain exposure; it could help someone trying to stop developers installing arbitrary unreviewed packages in builds, but the problem is instead to prevent users from launching unapproved interpreter-hosted payloads.

Question 446

To run an externally supplied utility without local administrator rights, which option is the direct technical match?

  1. Application inventory reconciliation
  2. Privilege-restricted application
  3. Code signing pipeline
  4. Library loading control

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Least-privilege execution limits damage from compromise while preserving needed user functions; that is why it addresses the operational task to run an externally supplied utility without local administrator rights.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Comparing actual executable inventory to approved catalogs exposes drift and unsupported software; it addresses the different need to find obsolete applications still running after retirement approval, leaving the requested ability to run an externally supplied utility without local administrator rights unresolved.

C:

Publisher signatures link deliverables to controlled private keys and expose unauthorized modification; its mechanism supports authenticate distributed business application packages before installation, while the requested control must be able to run an externally supplied utility without local administrator rights.

D:

Search-path and dependency restrictions address sideloading even when the main executable is approved; the outcome it supports is to prevent signed applications from importing untrusted local DLLs, whereas this scenario asks defenders to run an externally supplied utility without local administrator rights.

Question 447

To authenticate distributed business application packages before installation, which approach should a application security engineer choose?

  1. Privilege-restricted application
  2. Application inventory reconciliation
  3. Code signing pipeline
  4. Script interpreter restriction

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Publisher signatures link deliverables to controlled private keys and expose unauthorized modification; its relevant protective or investigative effect is to authenticate distributed business application packages before installation.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Least-privilege execution limits damage from compromise while preserving needed user functions; applying it would serve run an externally supplied utility without local administrator rights without directly satisfying the goal to authenticate distributed business application packages before installation.

B:

Comparing actual executable inventory to approved catalogs exposes drift and unsupported software; it addresses the different need to find obsolete applications still running after retirement approval, leaving the requested ability to authenticate distributed business application packages before installation unresolved.

D:

Execution policy must consider scripting engines and command shells, not only packaged executables; its mechanism supports prevent users from launching unapproved interpreter-hosted payloads, while the requested control must be able to authenticate distributed business application packages before installation.

Question 448

To prevent signed applications from importing untrusted local DLLs and to stop developers installing arbitrary unreviewed packages in builds, which TWO measures should the defender select? Choose TWO.

  1. Package repository allowlist
  2. Code signing pipeline
  3. Library loading control
  4. Privilege-restricted application
  5. Application denylisting

Explanation

Correct Answers

A:

Approved sources and integrity validation restrict dependency supply-chain exposure; its contribution to the combined design is specifically to stop developers installing arbitrary unreviewed packages in builds.

C:

Search-path and dependency restrictions address sideloading even when the main executable is approved; its contribution to the combined design is specifically to prevent signed applications from importing untrusted local DLLs.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Publisher signatures link deliverables to controlled private keys and expose unauthorized modification; applying it would serve authenticate distributed business application packages before installation without directly satisfying the goal to prevent signed applications from importing untrusted local DLLs and to stop developers installing arbitrary unreviewed packages in builds.

D:

Least-privilege execution limits damage from compromise while preserving needed user functions; the technique works for situations involving run an externally supplied utility without local administrator rights, rather than this need to prevent signed applications from importing untrusted local DLLs and to stop developers installing arbitrary unreviewed packages in builds.

E:

Negative lists stop identified software but do not prevent execution of unknown unwanted programs; its mechanism supports block a known unwanted tool while leaving other applications generally permitted, while the requested control must be able to prevent signed applications from importing untrusted local DLLs and to stop developers installing arbitrary unreviewed packages in builds.

Question 449

To stop developers installing arbitrary unreviewed packages in builds, what technique should the team use?

  1. Script interpreter restriction
  2. Library loading control
  3. Package repository allowlist
  4. Execution block audit mode

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Approved sources and integrity validation restrict dependency supply-chain exposure; this choice fits the scenario because the team must stop developers installing arbitrary unreviewed packages in builds.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Execution policy must consider scripting engines and command shells, not only packaged executables; a team would select it to prevent users from launching unapproved interpreter-hosted payloads, which does not provide the particular result to stop developers installing arbitrary unreviewed packages in builds.

B:

Search-path and dependency restrictions address sideloading even when the main executable is approved; its operational purpose is to prevent signed applications from importing untrusted local DLLs, not to achieve the specific requirement to stop developers installing arbitrary unreviewed packages in builds.

D:

Audit-only events reveal potential operational breakage without immediately denying legitimate processes; it addresses the different need to test an application-control policy before enforcing it everywhere, leaving the requested ability to stop developers installing arbitrary unreviewed packages in builds unresolved.

Question 450

To find obsolete applications still running after retirement approval, which protective or investigative measure applies?

  1. Privilege-restricted application
  2. Execution block audit mode
  3. Application inventory reconciliation
  4. Library loading control
  5. Package repository allowlist

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Comparing actual executable inventory to approved catalogs exposes drift and unsupported software; this mechanism directly supports the requirement to find obsolete applications still running after retirement approval.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Least-privilege execution limits damage from compromise while preserving needed user functions; that is useful when the task is to run an externally supplied utility without local administrator rights, not the stated requirement to find obsolete applications still running after retirement approval.

B:

Audit-only events reveal potential operational breakage without immediately denying legitimate processes; a team would select it to test an application-control policy before enforcing it everywhere, which does not provide the particular result to find obsolete applications still running after retirement approval.

D:

Search-path and dependency restrictions address sideloading even when the main executable is approved; applying it would serve prevent signed applications from importing untrusted local DLLs without directly satisfying the goal to find obsolete applications still running after retirement approval.

E:

Approved sources and integrity validation restrict dependency supply-chain exposure; it addresses the different need to stop developers installing arbitrary unreviewed packages in builds, leaving the requested ability to find obsolete applications still running after retirement approval unresolved.

Certified Network Defender (312-38) Practice Tests