Question 190
To remove plaintext remote management from a network appliance, which practice addresses that objective?
- Switch port security
- Control-plane policing
- SSH-only administration
- Management ACL
- Unused port shutdown
- AAA command accounting
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:SSH encrypts credentials and CLI sessions, unlike Telnet access over a monitored segment; the requested outcome is precisely to remove plaintext remote management from a network appliance.
Incorrect Answers
A:Port security detects unexpected attached devices under configured violation and aging behavior; that is useful when the task is to limit acceptable learned MAC addresses on a designated access port, not the stated requirement to remove plaintext remote management from a network appliance.
B:CoPP rate-limits packets destined to the device control plane rather than normal transit data; a team would select it to protect a router CPU from floods aimed at routing and management functions, which does not provide the particular result to remove plaintext remote management from a network appliance.
D:Source-based control narrows the management surface before authentication is attempted; applying it would serve allow administrative login only from designated operations hosts without directly satisfying the goal to remove plaintext remote management from a network appliance.
E:Disabling unused access interfaces removes a physical path until an authorized change enables it; it addresses the different need to stop an attacker using vacant office switch sockets for network entry, leaving the requested ability to remove plaintext remote management from a network appliance unresolved.
F:Centralized device accounting associates privileged actions with authenticated operator identities; the technique works for situations involving record which administrator issued sensitive configuration commands, rather than this need to remove plaintext remote management from a network appliance.
Question 191
To record which administrator issued sensitive configuration commands, which tool, policy, or technique is appropriate?
- Root Guard
- Management ACL
- AAA command accounting
- SSH-only administration
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Centralized device accounting associates privileged actions with authenticated operator identities; this choice fits the scenario because the team must record which administrator issued sensitive configuration commands.
Incorrect Answers
A:Root Guard blocks superior BPDUs on intended non-root-facing ports; it could help someone trying to prevent an untrusted switch link from becoming the spanning-tree root path, but the problem is instead to record which administrator issued sensitive configuration commands.
B:Source-based control narrows the management surface before authentication is attempted; that is useful when the task is to allow administrative login only from designated operations hosts, not the stated requirement to record which administrator issued sensitive configuration commands.
D:SSH encrypts credentials and CLI sessions, unlike Telnet access over a monitored segment; its operational purpose is to remove plaintext remote management from a network appliance, not to achieve the specific requirement to record which administrator issued sensitive configuration commands.
Question 192
To stop an attacker using vacant office switch sockets for network entry, what safeguard would be most applicable?
- Unused port shutdown
- Storm control
- Root Guard
- AAA command accounting
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Disabling unused access interfaces removes a physical path until an authorized change enables it; this mechanism directly supports the requirement to stop an attacker using vacant office switch sockets for network entry.
Incorrect Answers
B:Switch thresholds protect forwarding capacity from Layer-2 floods without authenticating packet senders; it could help someone trying to limit excessive broadcast, multicast or unknown-unicast traffic, but the problem is instead to stop an attacker using vacant office switch sockets for network entry.
C:Root Guard blocks superior BPDUs on intended non-root-facing ports; that is useful when the task is to prevent an untrusted switch link from becoming the spanning-tree root path, not the stated requirement to stop an attacker using vacant office switch sockets for network entry.
D:Centralized device accounting associates privileged actions with authenticated operator identities; a team would select it to record which administrator issued sensitive configuration commands, which does not provide the particular result to stop an attacker using vacant office switch sockets for network entry.
Question 193
To limit acceptable learned MAC addresses on a designated access port, what is the relevant defensive action?
- Unused port shutdown
- Root Guard
- Switch port security
- Management ACL
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Port security detects unexpected attached devices under configured violation and aging behavior; it supplies the specific control needed to limit acceptable learned MAC addresses on a designated access port.
Incorrect Answers
A:Disabling unused access interfaces removes a physical path until an authorized change enables it; the outcome it supports is to stop an attacker using vacant office switch sockets for network entry, whereas this scenario asks defenders to limit acceptable learned MAC addresses on a designated access port.
B:Root Guard blocks superior BPDUs on intended non-root-facing ports; although relevant to prevent an untrusted switch link from becoming the spanning-tree root path, it does not by itself achieve the required task to limit acceptable learned MAC addresses on a designated access port.
D:Source-based control narrows the management surface before authentication is attempted; that is useful when the task is to allow administrative login only from designated operations hosts, not the stated requirement to limit acceptable learned MAC addresses on a designated access port.
Question 194
To protect end-user access ports from unexpected spanning-tree participation, which option most directly provides the capability?
- BPDU Guard
- Storm control
- AAA command accounting
- Unused port shutdown
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Guard can err-disable an edge interface receiving BPDUs, limiting topology manipulation; that is why it addresses the operational task to protect end-user access ports from unexpected spanning-tree participation.
Incorrect Answers
B:Switch thresholds protect forwarding capacity from Layer-2 floods without authenticating packet senders; the outcome it supports is to limit excessive broadcast, multicast or unknown-unicast traffic, whereas this scenario asks defenders to protect end-user access ports from unexpected spanning-tree participation.
C:Centralized device accounting associates privileged actions with authenticated operator identities; although relevant to record which administrator issued sensitive configuration commands, it does not by itself achieve the required task to protect end-user access ports from unexpected spanning-tree participation.
D:Disabling unused access interfaces removes a physical path until an authorized change enables it; it could help someone trying to stop an attacker using vacant office switch sockets for network entry, but the problem is instead to protect end-user access ports from unexpected spanning-tree participation.
Question 195
To prevent an untrusted switch link from becoming the spanning-tree root path, which control achieves the target outcome?
- Switch port security
- AAA command accounting
- Unused service removal
- Root Guard
- Storm control
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Root Guard blocks superior BPDUs on intended non-root-facing ports; its relevant protective or investigative effect is to prevent an untrusted switch link from becoming the spanning-tree root path.
Incorrect Answers
A:Port security detects unexpected attached devices under configured violation and aging behavior; the technique works for situations involving limit acceptable learned MAC addresses on a designated access port, rather than this need to prevent an untrusted switch link from becoming the spanning-tree root path.
B:Centralized device accounting associates privileged actions with authenticated operator identities; its mechanism supports record which administrator issued sensitive configuration commands, while the requested control must be able to prevent an untrusted switch link from becoming the spanning-tree root path.
C:Reducing active management and discovery services cuts the number of reachable software components; the outcome it supports is to eliminate exposed device daemons not required for operations, whereas this scenario asks defenders to prevent an untrusted switch link from becoming the spanning-tree root path.
E:Switch thresholds protect forwarding capacity from Layer-2 floods without authenticating packet senders; it could help someone trying to limit excessive broadcast, multicast or unknown-unicast traffic, but the problem is instead to prevent an untrusted switch link from becoming the spanning-tree root path.
Question 196
To limit excessive broadcast, multicast or unknown-unicast traffic, which solution should be adopted?
- Unused service removal
- Routing protocol authentication
- Storm control
- BPDU Guard
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Switch thresholds protect forwarding capacity from Layer-2 floods without authenticating packet senders; the requested outcome is precisely to limit excessive broadcast, multicast or unknown-unicast traffic.
Incorrect Answers
A:Reducing active management and discovery services cuts the number of reachable software components; it addresses the different need to eliminate exposed device daemons not required for operations, leaving the requested ability to limit excessive broadcast, multicast or unknown-unicast traffic unresolved.
B:Cryptographic neighbor authentication verifies accepted control messages under the protocol's supported model; the technique works for situations involving stop unauthorized peers injecting updates into a dynamic routing domain, rather than this need to limit excessive broadcast, multicast or unknown-unicast traffic.
D:Guard can err-disable an edge interface receiving BPDUs, limiting topology manipulation; the outcome it supports is to protect end-user access ports from unexpected spanning-tree participation, whereas this scenario asks defenders to limit excessive broadcast, multicast or unknown-unicast traffic.
Question 197
To stop unauthorized peers injecting updates into a dynamic routing domain and to eliminate exposed device daemons not required for operations, which TWO measures should the defender select? Choose TWO.
- Unused service removal
- Storm control
- Unused port shutdown
- BPDU Guard
- Routing protocol authentication
Explanation
Correct Answers
A:Reducing active management and discovery services cuts the number of reachable software components; it satisfies the distinct requirement to eliminate exposed device daemons not required for operations within the multi-control task.
E:Cryptographic neighbor authentication verifies accepted control messages under the protocol's supported model; it satisfies the distinct requirement to stop unauthorized peers injecting updates into a dynamic routing domain within the multi-control task.
Incorrect Answers
B:Switch thresholds protect forwarding capacity from Layer-2 floods without authenticating packet senders; it addresses the different need to limit excessive broadcast, multicast or unknown-unicast traffic, leaving the requested ability to stop unauthorized peers injecting updates into a dynamic routing domain and to eliminate exposed device daemons not required for operations unresolved.
C:Disabling unused access interfaces removes a physical path until an authorized change enables it; the technique works for situations involving stop an attacker using vacant office switch sockets for network entry, rather than this need to stop unauthorized peers injecting updates into a dynamic routing domain and to eliminate exposed device daemons not required for operations.
D:Guard can err-disable an edge interface receiving BPDUs, limiting topology manipulation; its mechanism supports protect end-user access ports from unexpected spanning-tree participation, while the requested control must be able to stop unauthorized peers injecting updates into a dynamic routing domain and to eliminate exposed device daemons not required for operations.
Question 198
To eliminate exposed device daemons not required for operations, which of the available controls is suitable?
- Root Guard
- Unused service removal
- BPDU Guard
- Switch port security
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Reducing active management and discovery services cuts the number of reachable software components; this mechanism directly supports the requirement to eliminate exposed device daemons not required for operations.
Incorrect Answers
A:Root Guard blocks superior BPDUs on intended non-root-facing ports; its operational purpose is to prevent an untrusted switch link from becoming the spanning-tree root path, not to achieve the specific requirement to eliminate exposed device daemons not required for operations.
C:Guard can err-disable an edge interface receiving BPDUs, limiting topology manipulation; it addresses the different need to protect end-user access ports from unexpected spanning-tree participation, leaving the requested ability to eliminate exposed device daemons not required for operations unresolved.
D:Port security detects unexpected attached devices under configured violation and aging behavior; the technique works for situations involving limit acceptable learned MAC addresses on a designated access port, rather than this need to eliminate exposed device daemons not required for operations.
Question 199
To publish a web service without granting internet clients direct app-server access, which option is the direct technical match?
- DMZ reverse proxy
- Zero-trust application gateway
- Dual-homed firewall
- Software-defined perimeter
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:A front-end proxy terminates client sessions and forwards approved requests under defined routing policy; it supplies the specific control needed to publish a web service without granting internet clients direct app-server access.
Incorrect Answers
B:Application-aware brokering limits access to named resources without broad network placement; its operational purpose is to require authentication for each private application rather than full-subnet VPN trust, not to achieve the specific requirement to publish a web service without granting internet clients direct app-server access.
C:A multi-interface gateway mediates traffic rather than allowing unrestricted direct Layer-2 connectivity; applying it would serve join two security zones through explicitly inspected interfaces without directly satisfying the goal to publish a web service without granting internet clients direct app-server access.
D:Controller-mediated access establishes narrowly scoped connectivity without publishing every service to all clients; it addresses the different need to hide private application endpoints until identity and device policy authorize access, leaving the requested ability to publish a web service without granting internet clients direct app-server access unresolved.
Question 200
To give administrators one monitored path into a protected DMZ, which approach should a perimeter engineer choose?
- DMZ reverse proxy
- Zero-trust application gateway
- Software-defined perimeter
- Dual-homed firewall
- Bastion host placement
Explanation
Correct Answer
E:A hardened jump system reduces scattered inbound management exposure across multiple hosts; that is why it addresses the operational task to give administrators one monitored path into a protected DMZ.
Incorrect Answers
A:A front-end proxy terminates client sessions and forwards approved requests under defined routing policy; that is useful when the task is to publish a web service without granting internet clients direct app-server access, not the stated requirement to give administrators one monitored path into a protected DMZ.
B:Application-aware brokering limits access to named resources without broad network placement; a team would select it to require authentication for each private application rather than full-subnet VPN trust, which does not provide the particular result to give administrators one monitored path into a protected DMZ.
C:Controller-mediated access establishes narrowly scoped connectivity without publishing every service to all clients; its operational purpose is to hide private application endpoints until identity and device policy authorize access, not to achieve the specific requirement to give administrators one monitored path into a protected DMZ.
D:A multi-interface gateway mediates traffic rather than allowing unrestricted direct Layer-2 connectivity; applying it would serve join two security zones through explicitly inspected interfaces without directly satisfying the goal to give administrators one monitored path into a protected DMZ.