Question 180
A switch learns an overwhelming number of fabricated source MAC addresses and forwarding behavior degrades. Which attack class is illustrated?
- Rogue DHCP server
- Switch port security
- DHCP snooping
- MAC flooding
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:MAC flooding seeks to exhaust or disrupt a switch's forwarding table. Port security and platform controls can limit learned-address abuse.
Incorrect Answers
A:A rogue DHCP server can distribute incorrect addressing and resolver settings, redirecting traffic; it is useful for unauthorized distribution of network configuration but leaves saturation of a switch's learned address table unproven.
B:Port security constrains MAC-address learning on specified interfaces and can respond to violations; this is tied to limits on endpoint MAC addresses at a switch port rather than confirming saturation of a switch's learned address table.
C:DHCP snooping filters untrusted DHCP server responses and builds lease-binding information; it focuses on blocking DHCP server messages from untrusted ports and therefore does not demonstrate saturation of a switch's learned address table.
Question 181
A defender identifies hundreds of compromised household devices coordinating high-volume traffic. What infrastructure underlies the attack?
- Amplification attack
- Botnet participation
- Reflection attack
- DNS reflection mitigation
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:A botnet is a collection of compromised devices controlled to perform coordinated malicious activity. IoT default passwords and exposed services often enable recruitment.
Incorrect Answers
A:Amplification exploits a high response-to-request size ratio; selecting it would address disproportionately large responses to small requests instead of many hijacked devices acting under common control.
C:Reflection uses intermediaries to send responses toward a spoofed victim address; its technical boundary is unwanted replies emitted by third-party services rather than many hijacked devices acting under common control.
D:Open resolver participation in reflected DNS traffic is its purpose, whereas the case requires many hijacked devices acting under common control.
Question 182
A web application wishes to limit how much of the referring URL is sent to other sites when users click links. What policy controls this?
- Content Security Policy
- HSTS policy
- X-Content-Type-Options
- Clickjacking frame policy
- Referrer-Policy
Explanation
Correct Answer
E:Referrer-Policy governs referrer information exposed on navigations and subresource requests. It can reduce leakage of sensitive URL paths or queries.
Incorrect Answers
A:Content Security Policy defines allowed sources and other content restrictions; even if useful for browser restrictions on executable script sources, it does not establish disclosure of origin and path in referrer headers.
B:HTTP Strict Transport Security directs supporting browsers to prefer HTTPS; the result would concern browser enforcement of HTTPS on subsequent visits, leaving disclosure of origin and path in referrer headers unresolved.
C:The nosniff directive limits MIME-type sniffing in supported contexts; it is aimed at browser MIME-type guessing for downloaded content and would not resolve disclosure of origin and path in referrer headers.
D:CSP frame-ancestors or supported legacy frame restrictions control who may embed a page; this does not verify disclosure of origin and path in referrer headers, because its scope is untrusted framing of sensitive web pages.
Question 183
A multi-account company wants continuous detection of publicly exposed storage and excessive IAM privileges. Which tool category fits?
- Cloud security posture management
- Cloud IAM least privilege
- Misconfigured object storage
- Hybrid cloud
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:CSPM solutions assess cloud configurations against policy and best practices across accounts. Findings still require ownership and remediation.
Incorrect Answers
B:Cloud IAM policies should grant only required actions on specific resources; this can contribute to narrow resource permissions for a cloud workload but does not prove continuous cloud configuration risk assessment.
C:Public object access exposes data when policy or ACLs permit anonymous reads; the question hinges on continuous cloud configuration risk assessment, not on unintended anonymous access to cloud objects.
D:Hybrid cloud combines distinct cloud or infrastructure environments with integration; it serves integrated public and private infrastructure and cannot by itself resolve continuous cloud configuration risk assessment.
Question 184
One consumer app should not read another app's private data directory on a normally configured phone. Which security design enforces this?
- Rooted Android device
- iOS code signing
- Mobile full-disk/file encryption
- Mobile sandbox isolation
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Application sandboxing isolates app processes and storage using platform identities and permissions. Exploits or intentional sharing mechanisms can cross defined boundaries.
Incorrect Answers
A:Rooting grants or enables elevated control beyond ordinary application sandboxes; this is tied to elevated privileges beyond normal Android sandboxing rather than confirming separation of private data belonging to different apps.
B:Apple platform code signing checks app authenticity and integrity under permitted installation paths; it focuses on trusted application code loaded on iOS and therefore does not demonstrate separation of private data belonging to different apps.
C:This addresses confidentiality of stored data on a lost phone, a different concern from separation of private data belonging to different apps.
Question 185
An assessment account needs read-only access to inventory, not permission to delete devices. Which principle determines the proper access level?
- Defense in depth
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Least privilege
- Availability
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Least privilege grants only the capabilities required for the assigned task. Limiting privileges reduces the damage from credential theft or operator mistakes.
Incorrect Answers
A:Layered defenses place different controls along an attack path; the mechanism relates to multiple complementary barriers across the attack path rather than the narrowest role sufficient for inventory inspection.
B:Confidentiality protects information from disclosure to unauthorized parties; this does not verify the narrowest role sufficient for inventory inspection, because its scope is unauthorized disclosure of the stored data.
C:Integrity means data and configurations remain accurate and unaltered without authorization; it may reveal unauthorized modification of security settings, but the scenario is about the narrowest role sufficient for inventory inspection.
E:Availability means authorized users can reach services when needed; this can contribute to the service's accessibility to legitimate users but does not prove the narrowest role sufficient for inventory inspection.
Question 186
A passive network sensor sees TLS flows but lacks access to decrypted payloads. What visibility limitation applies?
- Application proxy firewall
- Anomaly IDS trade-off
- Signature IDS limitation
- Encrypted traffic inspection gap
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Encryption hides application content from passive network inspection. Flow metadata, endpoints, or authorized decryption may provide additional detection context.
Incorrect Answers
A:That observation explains application-aware mediation of client requests without demonstrating absence of plaintext contents in encrypted flows.
B:This choice describes false alarms from deviations that are benign; the observed condition calls for absence of plaintext contents in encrypted flows.
C:Signature-based detection depends on recognizable patterns and timely rule updates; this can contribute to dependence on pre-existing attack patterns but does not prove absence of plaintext contents in encrypted flows.
Question 187
The team has two findings with similar scores, but one sits on an internet-facing authentication gateway. What guides sensible order of remediation?
- Risk-based prioritization
- False negative review
- Unauthenticated vulnerability scan
- Credentialed vulnerability scan
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Prioritization considers exploitability, exposure, asset value, threat activity, and operational impact. A raw severity score alone cannot express every environmental factor.
Incorrect Answers
B:This choice affects a real flaw absent from scan results, while the identified issue is which finding presents greater operational risk.
C:Unauthenticated scanning evaluates externally visible services; the result would concern externally observable weaknesses without credentials, leaving which finding presents greater operational risk unresolved.
D:Authenticated scanning can inspect installed packages, local settings, and patch state; the relevant outcome would be host-internal patch and configuration findings, not which finding presents greater operational risk.
Question 188
A visitor watches a user type an unlock code over their shoulder. Which information-gathering technique is demonstrated?
- Pretexting
- Shoulder surfing
- Tailgating
- Baiting
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Shoulder surfing obtains sensitive input through direct observation or recording. Privacy screens and awareness reduce casual exposure in shared spaces.
Incorrect Answers
A:Pretexting establishes a false identity or situation to justify a requested disclosure; it serves a fabricated scenario used to solicit information and cannot by itself resolve visual observation of a private secret.
C:Tailgating exploits another person's authorized entry to bypass physical access control; the relevant outcome would be unauthorized entry behind an authorized person, not visual observation of a private secret.
D:Baiting offers an enticing object or apparent benefit to encourage unsafe interaction; despite its value for curiosity induced by an enticing object, it cannot substantiate visual observation of a private secret.
Question 189
A database host makes an unexpected external DNS request triggered by processing untrusted input, while the web response contains no data. What extraction channel might this illustrate?
- Time-based blind SQL injection
- UNION-based SQL injection
- Out-of-band SQL injection
- Boolean-based blind SQL injection
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Out-of-band injection relies on a separate channel such as DNS or HTTP to convey effects or data. It depends on backend capabilities and outbound connectivity.
Incorrect Answers
A:Time-based blind injection uses deliberately distinguishable delays to infer hidden conditions; the gap to resolve is database effects observable through a secondary channel, not the separate matter of response-time differences reflecting database conditions.
B:UNION injection adds compatible query results to an existing SELECT output; it helps explain combining attacker-chosen rows with query output, but not database effects observable through a secondary channel.
D:Boolean-based blind injection infers database information from observable true-or-false application behavior; this does not verify database effects observable through a secondary channel, because its scope is two-state response differences driven by database conditions.
Question 190
An application instantiates objects from untrusted serialized input with side effects during reconstruction. What vulnerability family is relevant?
- Cross-site request forgery
- Authentication rate control
- Insecure deserialization
- Server-side request forgery
- Path traversal
- Unrestricted file upload
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Unsafe deserialization can invoke dangerous gadget behaviors or corrupt application state. Avoiding untrusted object reconstruction and using strict formats mitigates the risk.
Incorrect Answers
A:CSRF abuses the browser's automatic attachment of authentication context to cross-site requests; even if useful for forged authenticated actions initiated from another site, it does not establish unsafe object reconstruction from attacker-controlled data.
B:Adaptive throttling and related abuse controls slow online credential attacks; it is aimed at limits on repeated online login attempts and would not resolve unsafe object reconstruction from attacker-controlled data.
D:SSRF occurs when a server makes network requests to attacker-influenced destinations; the question hinges on unsafe object reconstruction from attacker-controlled data, not on untrusted influence over server-originated requests.
E:Path traversal permits filesystem navigation beyond an authorized base path through untrusted input; that observation explains escape from an intended filesystem directory without demonstrating unsafe object reconstruction from attacker-controlled data.
F:Unsafe uploads can enable code execution or content attacks when types; the result would concern execution risk from uploaded user-controlled files, leaving unsafe object reconstruction from attacker-controlled data unresolved.