ECCouncil 312-50v13 (Certified Ethical Hacker v13) Practice Test 15

Question 140

Endpoints receive malicious DNS and gateway settings from an unauthorized DHCP responder. What is the immediate network risk?

  1. Rogue DHCP server
  2. Switch port security
  3. DHCP starvation
  4. DHCP snooping

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

A rogue DHCP server can distribute incorrect addressing and resolver settings, redirecting traffic. DHCP snooping can prevent untrusted ports from issuing server responses.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Port security constrains MAC-address learning on specified interfaces and can respond to violations; evidence about limits on endpoint MAC addresses at a switch port would not answer the concern about unauthorized distribution of network configuration.

C:

DHCP starvation exhausts available addresses by consuming leases; it may reveal lease-pool exhaustion through bogus requests, but the scenario is about unauthorized distribution of network configuration.

D:

DHCP snooping filters untrusted DHCP server responses and builds lease-binding information; it describes blocking DHCP server messages from untrusted ports; the observed condition calls for unauthorized distribution of network configuration.

Question 141

A legacy network uses NetBIOS names, and an auditor needs names registered by a host. Which data set provides them?

  1. NFS root squashing
  2. DNS zone transfer exposure
  3. NetBIOS name table
  4. SMB signing requirement

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

NetBIOS name tables list registered host and service names where the legacy protocol is enabled. Modern networks may disable this interface.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Root squashing maps remote root requests to an unprivileged identity; despite its value for restriction of remote root privileges on exports, it cannot substantiate legacy host and service names.

B:

An unrestricted AXFR can disclose a large set of zone resource records; the question hinges on legacy host and service names, not on bulk DNS zone disclosure through AXFR.

D:

SMB signing adds integrity checks to supported SMB messages; this is tied to integrity protection for SMB traffic rather than confirming legacy host and service names.

Question 142

A sensor misses a new variant with no matching known rule, despite detecting older versions. Which weakness is illustrated?

  1. Anomaly IDS trade-off
  2. Web application firewall
  3. Signature IDS limitation
  4. Application proxy firewall

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Signature-based detection depends on recognizable patterns and timely rule updates. Unknown or modified techniques can bypass static signatures.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This choice serves false alarms from deviations that are benign and cannot by itself resolve dependence on pre-existing attack patterns.

B:

A WAF applies HTTP-oriented rules to requests and sometimes responses; even if useful for application-layer inspection of malicious web requests, it does not establish dependence on pre-existing attack patterns.

D:

The scenario tests dependence on pre-existing attack patterns, which is distinct from application-aware mediation of client requests.

Question 143

Choose TWO. Two public-source aggregators disagree about a company's historical hostnames, and some addresses are shared by many tenants. Which TWO practices help the analyst avoid falsely attributing third-party infrastructure to the client?

  1. Record each observation's source, collection date, and confidence
  2. Corroborate candidates against current authoritative DNS and verified ownership information
  3. Assume every hostname sharing a CDN address belongs to the client
  4. Treat old archived records as conclusive proof of present ownership
  5. Silently omit any evidence that contradicts the preferred asset list

Explanation

Correct Answers

A:

Capturing provenance and time distinguishes historical evidence from the current state and allows another analyst to review the claim. Uncertainty should be explicit in the result.

B:

Independent validation against current authoritative records and defensible ownership data reduces false matches from retired DNS entries and shared-hosting infrastructure.

Incorrect Answers

C:

CDN and shared-hosting addresses commonly serve unrelated customers. IP co-location alone does not establish asset ownership or authorization to test a hostname.

D:

An archived DNS result can be valuable historical context, but associations and hosting ownership may have changed since it was collected.

E:

Suppressing contrary evidence creates unjustified certainty. A defensible OSINT report should retain discrepancies, their sources, and unresolved attribution limits.

Question 144

Clients unexpectedly disconnect after receiving large numbers of forged management disconnect messages on an older WLAN. What attack concept is implicated?

  1. Deauthentication frame abuse
  2. Rogue access point
  3. Evil twin access point
  4. SSID hiding limitation

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Forged deauthentication or disassociation frames can disrupt susceptible wireless clients. Protected management frames mitigate supported cases.

Incorrect Answers

B:

A rogue AP provides unauthorized wireless connectivity to protected infrastructure; it can help assess unapproved wireless infrastructure attached to a network but would not demonstrate unauthorized 802.11 disconnect messages.

C:

An evil twin imitates a trusted wireless network to attract client connections; its technical boundary is imitation of a legitimate wireless network rather than unauthorized 802.11 disconnect messages.

D:

Suppressing routine beacon advertisement does not provide authentication or encryption; the mechanism relates to relying on a hidden name for wireless security rather than unauthorized 802.11 disconnect messages.

Question 145

An installed Windows application requests a helper DLL by filename alone. A standard user can write to a folder that the loader searches before the intended trusted copy. Which weakness could allow attacker-controlled code to run with the application’s privileges?

  1. An unquoted service executable path
  2. DLL search-order hijacking
  3. A writable registry Run key
  4. Pass-the-hash authentication

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

DLL search-order hijacking occurs when an application loads an untrusted library from a writable location selected before the intended DLL. Use trusted full paths and safe loading configurations to close the exposure.

Incorrect Answers

A:

An unquoted service path may allow an unintended executable to run when a path with spaces is misparsed. Here, the unsafe boundary is resolution of a DLL filename, not parsing a service executable path.

C:

A writable Run key can start an unauthorized program at sign-in. The stem concerns library resolution during application execution rather than registration of a logon-triggered command.

D:

Pass-the-hash concerns authentication using reusable password-derived hash material without knowing a plaintext password. There is no network authentication event or stolen hash in this case.

Question 146

Choose TWO. Before a consultancy begins active probing of a client's payment environment, which preparations establish a defensible permission and safety boundary?

  1. A signed authorization from the environment's owner
  2. A draft vulnerability summary created before any testing
  3. A list of social-media followers
  4. A screenshot of the site's public homepage
  5. A written rules-of-engagement agreement listing excluded systems and stop conditions

Explanation

Correct Answers

A:

Explicit owner approval establishes legal permission for the named activity; the assessor should verify the signer controls the assets and the approval covers the intended methods.

E:

The engagement rules make scope exclusions, time windows, emergency contacts, and stop triggers operational; approval without such constraints can expose fragile services.

Incorrect Answers

B:

A report template is useful for later documentation, yet writing projected findings provides no authorization to touch production workloads.

C:

Social profile data may inform public research but cannot substitute for an asset owner's explicit testing agreement.

D:

Public visibility can assist reconnaissance, but a home page provides neither owner consent nor the constraints needed for intrusive probes.

Question 147

A page changes its response duration based on the truth of a database-controlled condition but reveals no data. What inference method is indicated?

  1. Time-based blind SQL injection
  2. Error-based SQL injection
  3. Out-of-band SQL injection
  4. Boolean-based blind SQL injection

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Time-based blind injection uses deliberately distinguishable delays to infer hidden conditions. Latency noise makes careful observation necessary in authorized tests.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Error-based SQL injection uses informative database errors; this is tied to database error messages revealing query behavior rather than confirming response-time differences reflecting database conditions.

C:

Out-of-band injection relies on a separate channel such as DNS or HTTP; the scenario tests response-time differences reflecting database conditions, which is distinct from database effects observable through a secondary channel.

D:

Boolean-based blind injection infers database information from observable true-or-false application behavior; despite its value for two-state response differences driven by database conditions, it cannot substantiate response-time differences reflecting database conditions.

Question 148

Choose TWO. A permitted port scan from an office VLAN shows a service as filtered, but a scan from an approved administrative VPN reports it as open. Which TWO environmental differences could legitimately explain the results?

  1. A source-zone-specific firewall rule permits traffic from the VPN
  2. The office and VPN routes traverse different filtering devices
  3. A listening TCP port must be equally reachable from every source
  4. The domain’s DNS MX preference determines TCP port filtering
  5. The port number itself authenticates the scanner to the application

Explanation

Correct Answers

A:

Firewall rules can treat source zones differently. An administrative VPN may be explicitly allowed to reach the port even when a regular office VLAN is blocked, so scan results depend on vantage point.

B:

Distinct routes can cross different ACLs, security gateways, or NAT configurations. An approved VPN path may therefore reach a service that is filtered from another source network.

Incorrect Answers

C:

Reachability is not a global property of a port. A firewall or network policy can admit one source and reject another even though the same service is listening.

D:

MX records select mail exchange hosts and their preference. They do not control packets admitted by TCP port firewalls on a specific route.

E:

A well-known port indicates a conventional service assignment but does not authenticate the initiating scanner or override source-based network access rules.

Question 149

A campus switch permits DHCP server messages only on uplinks marked trusted. Which protective feature is enabled?

  1. MAC flooding
  2. DHCP snooping
  3. Rogue DHCP server
  4. DHCP starvation

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

DHCP snooping filters untrusted DHCP server responses and builds lease-binding information. Those bindings can also support other layer-two protections.

Incorrect Answers

A:

MAC flooding seeks to exhaust or disrupt a switch's forwarding table; this does not verify blocking DHCP server messages from untrusted ports, because its scope is saturation of a switch's learned address table.

C:

The gap to resolve is blocking DHCP server messages from untrusted ports, not the separate matter of unauthorized distribution of network configuration.

D:

DHCP starvation consumes address leases to exhaust a pool. Restricting DHCP server responses to trusted switch ports is DHCP snooping, not an address-exhaustion technique.

Question 150

A building automation network permits unknown new devices to join indefinitely without administrative approval. Which lifecycle control is weak?

  1. MQTT access controls
  2. Passive OT asset discovery
  3. Zigbee trust provisioning
  4. OT safety versus IT availability

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Secure Zigbee commissioning and key management regulate which devices can join a mesh. Leaving permissive joining enabled increases unauthorized membership risk.

Incorrect Answers

A:

MQTT broker authentication and topic authorization govern which clients may publish or subscribe; that observation explains authorization to publish sensitive IoT messages without demonstrating controlled enrollment into a low-power wireless mesh.

B:

Passive OT discovery inventories systems by observing their communications instead of probing them. It does not determine whether unknown Zigbee devices may join a low-power mesh without approval.

D:

OT assessments must preserve safety and process continuity; the question hinges on controlled enrollment into a low-power wireless mesh, not on protection of physical operations during assessment.

Certified Ethical Hacker v13 (312-50v13) Practice Tests