Question 140
To validate the remote HTTPS service before exchanging sensitive data, which protective or investigative measure applies?
- Kerberos service tickets
- Network microsegmentation
- SSH key authentication
- TLS server authentication
- TACACS+ administrative AAA
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:The client checks the certificate identity and trust chain during the secure handshake; that is why it addresses the operational task to validate the remote HTTPS service before exchanging sensitive data.
Incorrect Answers
A:Tickets from trusted authentication infrastructure prove identity to service principals using shared cryptographic trust; that is useful when the task is to let domain users authenticate to services without resending passwords, not the stated requirement to validate the remote HTTPS service before exchanging sensitive data.
B:Fine-grained identity or workload controls reduce lateral movement inside a previously flat data center; a team would select it to restrict east-west workload communications by application policy, which does not provide the particular result to validate the remote HTTPS service before exchanging sensitive data.
C:Public-key authentication proves possession of a private key while SSH encrypts the interactive connection; its operational purpose is to replace reusable administrator passwords for remote CLI sessions, not to achieve the specific requirement to validate the remote HTTPS service before exchanging sensitive data.
E:TACACS+ commonly provides granular device-administration controls and recorded command activity; it addresses the different need to separate authentication, authorization and accounting for router command access, leaving the requested ability to validate the remote HTTPS service before exchanging sensitive data unresolved.
Question 141
During a first connection to a replacement SSH jump host, an operator needs assurance that the server is not an impostor. The operator has a trusted fingerprint from the infrastructure team. Which SSH safeguard should be applied?
- User public-key login to SSH
- Strict host-key checking against the verified fingerprint
- SSH agent forwarding to the server
- Rotating the operator's private SSH key
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Strict host-key verification compares the server key with a trusted fingerprint or verified known_hosts entry. A mismatch warns against connecting to a counterfeit or changed server.
Incorrect Answers
A:Client public-key authentication proves the user possesses a private key. By itself it does not establish that the SSH server is the expected host rather than an impersonator.
C:Agent forwarding allows a remote SSH session to request signatures through the client agent. It can increase exposure and does not verify the server's own identity.
D:Changing the operator's private key changes their client credential. It does not verify which SSH server accepted the connection, which is the actual requirement.
Question 142
To encrypt Ethernet traffic on a controlled Layer-2 network link and to restrict east-west workload communications by application policy, which TWO measures should the defender select? Choose TWO.
- SSH key authentication
- MACsec link protection
- IKEv2 negotiation
- TLS server authentication
- Network microsegmentation
Explanation
Correct Answers
B:IEEE 802.1AE protects frames on supported adjacent links; it does not secure every routed hop automatically; its contribution to the combined design is specifically to encrypt Ethernet traffic on a controlled Layer-2 network link.
E:Fine-grained identity or workload controls reduce lateral movement inside a previously flat data center; its contribution to the combined design is specifically to restrict east-west workload communications by application policy.
Incorrect Answers
A:Public-key authentication proves possession of a private key while SSH encrypts the interactive connection; although relevant to replace reusable administrator passwords for remote CLI sessions, it does not by itself achieve the required task to encrypt Ethernet traffic on a controlled Layer-2 network link and to restrict east-west workload communications by application policy.
C:IKEv2 authenticates peers and negotiates cryptographic parameters before protected data transmission; that is useful when the task is to establish and rekey IPsec security associations between peers, not the stated requirement to encrypt Ethernet traffic on a controlled Layer-2 network link and to restrict east-west workload communications by application policy.
D:The client checks the certificate identity and trust chain during the secure handshake; a team would select it to validate the remote HTTPS service before exchanging sensitive data, which does not provide the particular result to encrypt Ethernet traffic on a controlled Layer-2 network link and to restrict east-west workload communications by application policy.
Question 143
To restrict east-west workload communications by application policy, what should defenders select?
- Network microsegmentation
- TLS server authentication
- IKEv2 negotiation
- IPsec ESP
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Fine-grained identity or workload controls reduce lateral movement inside a previously flat data center; this choice fits the scenario because the team must restrict east-west workload communications by application policy.
Incorrect Answers
B:The client checks the certificate identity and trust chain during the secure handshake; although relevant to validate the remote HTTPS service before exchanging sensitive data, it does not by itself achieve the required task to restrict east-west workload communications by application policy.
C:IKEv2 authenticates peers and negotiates cryptographic parameters before protected data transmission; it could help someone trying to establish and rekey IPsec security associations between peers, but the problem is instead to restrict east-west workload communications by application policy.
D:ESP can encrypt and authenticate IP payloads in transport or tunnel mode with negotiated security associations; that is useful when the task is to protect confidentiality and integrity of traffic across an untrusted IP path, not the stated requirement to restrict east-west workload communications by application policy.
Question 144
To separate finance and guest broadcast domains on the same physical switches, which mechanism best fits?
- Inter-VLAN ACL
- VLAN isolation
- Management-plane isolation
- Guest network separation
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:VLAN membership divides Layer-2 traffic while routed inter-VLAN paths still require policy enforcement; this mechanism directly supports the requirement to separate finance and guest broadcast domains on the same physical switches.
Incorrect Answers
A:Routed access lists filter traffic between segments based on address, protocol and port rules; its mechanism supports permit a management subnet to reach only approved switch services, while the requested control must be able to separate finance and guest broadcast domains on the same physical switches.
C:Dedicated management paths and source restrictions narrow exposure of sensitive control interfaces; although relevant to make switch administration reachable only from a hardened operator network, it does not by itself achieve the required task to separate finance and guest broadcast domains on the same physical switches.
D:Dedicated guest routing and egress policies separate untrusted clients from business assets; it could help someone trying to keep visitor devices away from internal production subnets, but the problem is instead to separate finance and guest broadcast domains on the same physical switches.
Question 145
To permit a management subnet to reach only approved switch services, which measure best meets the requirement?
- VLAN isolation
- Inter-VLAN ACL
- Guest network separation
- Jump host access
- Private VLAN
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Routed access lists filter traffic between segments based on address, protocol and port rules; it supplies the specific control needed to permit a management subnet to reach only approved switch services.
Incorrect Answers
A:VLAN membership divides Layer-2 traffic while routed inter-VLAN paths still require policy enforcement; the technique works for situations involving separate finance and guest broadcast domains on the same physical switches, rather than this need to permit a management subnet to reach only approved switch services.
C:Dedicated guest routing and egress policies separate untrusted clients from business assets; the outcome it supports is to keep visitor devices away from internal production subnets, whereas this scenario asks defenders to permit a management subnet to reach only approved switch services.
D:A hardened intermediary provides a monitored access point without exposing every target to all client devices; although relevant to centralize administrator entry into a protected server segment, it does not by itself achieve the required task to permit a management subnet to reach only approved switch services.
E:Isolated or community ports constrain same-VLAN host reachability while retaining a shared gateway path; it could help someone trying to prevent neighboring hosts in a shared subnet from communicating directly, but the problem is instead to permit a management subnet to reach only approved switch services.
Question 146
To prevent neighboring hosts in a shared subnet from communicating directly, what control should be selected?
- Jump host access
- Guest network separation
- Private VLAN
- VLAN isolation
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Isolated or community ports constrain same-VLAN host reachability while retaining a shared gateway path; that is why it addresses the operational task to prevent neighboring hosts in a shared subnet from communicating directly.
Incorrect Answers
A:A hardened intermediary provides a monitored access point without exposing every target to all client devices; it addresses the different need to centralize administrator entry into a protected server segment, leaving the requested ability to prevent neighboring hosts in a shared subnet from communicating directly unresolved.
B:Dedicated guest routing and egress policies separate untrusted clients from business assets; the technique works for situations involving keep visitor devices away from internal production subnets, rather than this need to prevent neighboring hosts in a shared subnet from communicating directly.
D:VLAN membership divides Layer-2 traffic while routed inter-VLAN paths still require policy enforcement; the outcome it supports is to separate finance and guest broadcast domains on the same physical switches, whereas this scenario asks defenders to prevent neighboring hosts in a shared subnet from communicating directly.
Question 147
To keep visitor devices away from internal production subnets, which security control is most appropriate?
- Management-plane isolation
- Private VLAN
- Guest network separation
- Jump host access
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Dedicated guest routing and egress policies separate untrusted clients from business assets; its relevant protective or investigative effect is to keep visitor devices away from internal production subnets.
Incorrect Answers
A:Dedicated management paths and source restrictions narrow exposure of sensitive control interfaces; applying it would serve make switch administration reachable only from a hardened operator network without directly satisfying the goal to keep visitor devices away from internal production subnets.
B:Isolated or community ports constrain same-VLAN host reachability while retaining a shared gateway path; it addresses the different need to prevent neighboring hosts in a shared subnet from communicating directly, leaving the requested ability to keep visitor devices away from internal production subnets unresolved.
D:A hardened intermediary provides a monitored access point without exposing every target to all client devices; its mechanism supports centralize administrator entry into a protected server segment, while the requested control must be able to keep visitor devices away from internal production subnets.
Question 148
To make switch administration reachable only from a hardened operator network, what would a security architect implement or use?
- Management-plane isolation
- Guest network separation
- Network access control posture
- Jump host access
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Dedicated management paths and source restrictions narrow exposure of sensitive control interfaces; the requested outcome is precisely to make switch administration reachable only from a hardened operator network.
Incorrect Answers
B:Dedicated guest routing and egress policies separate untrusted clients from business assets; applying it would serve keep visitor devices away from internal production subnets without directly satisfying the goal to make switch administration reachable only from a hardened operator network.
C:NAC assessment can assign restricted access based on posture beyond initial user authentication; it addresses the different need to quarantine an endpoint that fails health and compliance checks, leaving the requested ability to make switch administration reachable only from a hardened operator network unresolved.
D:A hardened intermediary provides a monitored access point without exposing every target to all client devices; the technique works for situations involving centralize administrator entry into a protected server segment, rather than this need to make switch administration reachable only from a hardened operator network.
Question 149
To centralize administrator entry into a protected server segment, which practice addresses that objective?
- Network access control posture
- Management-plane isolation
- Private VLAN
- Jump host access
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:A hardened intermediary provides a monitored access point without exposing every target to all client devices; this choice fits the scenario because the team must centralize administrator entry into a protected server segment.
Incorrect Answers
A:NAC assessment can assign restricted access based on posture beyond initial user authentication; a team would select it to quarantine an endpoint that fails health and compliance checks, which does not provide the particular result to centralize administrator entry into a protected server segment.
B:Dedicated management paths and source restrictions narrow exposure of sensitive control interfaces; its operational purpose is to make switch administration reachable only from a hardened operator network, not to achieve the specific requirement to centralize administrator entry into a protected server segment.
C:Isolated or community ports constrain same-VLAN host reachability while retaining a shared gateway path. This can help to prevent neighboring hosts in a shared subnet from communicating directly, but it does not provide the particular mechanism required to centralize administrator entry into a protected server segment.
Question 150
To quarantine an endpoint that fails health and compliance checks, which tool, policy, or technique is appropriate?
- VPN split-tunnel policy
- Jump host access
- DNS resolver egress control
- Network access control posture
- Management-plane isolation
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:NAC assessment can assign restricted access based on posture beyond initial user authentication; this mechanism directly supports the requirement to quarantine an endpoint that fails health and compliance checks.
Incorrect Answers
A:Split routing affects inspection coverage, bandwidth and exposure; its security depends on explicit destinations; that is useful when the task is to decide whether remote users' internet traffic traverses corporate inspection, not the stated requirement to quarantine an endpoint that fails health and compliance checks.
B:A hardened intermediary provides a monitored access point without exposing every target to all client devices; a team would select it to centralize administrator entry into a protected server segment, which does not provide the particular result to quarantine an endpoint that fails health and compliance checks.
C:Outbound DNS restrictions steer standard resolution through approved recursive servers and security policy; its operational purpose is to stop endpoints bypassing monitored organizational name resolution, not to achieve the specific requirement to quarantine an endpoint that fails health and compliance checks.
E:Dedicated management paths and source restrictions narrow exposure of sensitive control interfaces; it addresses the different need to make switch administration reachable only from a hardened operator network, leaving the requested ability to quarantine an endpoint that fails health and compliance checks unresolved.