ECCouncil 312-38 (Certified Network Defender) Practice Test 1

Question 1

An investigator has read-only access to a suspected workstation and a verified gateway MAC address, but no permission to change switch configuration. To check whether the workstation learned a forged local IP-to-MAC mapping, what should the investigator examine?

  1. Unicast reverse-path forwarding
  2. Dynamic ARP inspection
  3. ARP cache inspection
  4. IP source guard

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Comparing the ARP table with authorized gateway mappings reveals redirection inside the broadcast domain; it supplies the specific control needed to identify a newly forged local IP-to-MAC mapping on a switched subnet.

Incorrect Answers

A:

RPF checks reverse routing reachability, reducing spoofed-source traffic when topology and asymmetry are considered; it could help someone trying to reject packets whose source route is inconsistent with the ingress interface, but the problem is instead to identify a newly forged local IP-to-MAC mapping on a switched subnet.

B:

Switch validation ties IP-to-MAC claims to trusted bindings and stops many same-VLAN poisoning attempts; that is useful when the task is to reject forged ARP messages using validated address bindings, not the stated requirement to identify a newly forged local IP-to-MAC mapping on a switched subnet.

D:

Binding-based filtering on an access port restricts source IP addresses independently of upstream routing rules; its operational purpose is to stop a host sending packets with a source address it was not assigned, not to achieve the specific requirement to identify a newly forged local IP-to-MAC mapping on a switched subnet.

Question 2

To block rogue DHCP replies from untrusted switch ports, which practice addresses that objective?

  1. DHCP snooping
  2. Rate limiting
  3. Dynamic ARP inspection
  4. ARP cache inspection

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Trusted-port enforcement discards unauthorized server responses before clients accept hostile gateway settings; that is why it addresses the operational task to block rogue DHCP replies from untrusted switch ports.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Traffic policing reduces abuse volume while leaving permitted traffic possible within the configured threshold; it could help someone trying to cap bursts of excessive packets toward an exposed service, but the problem is instead to block rogue DHCP replies from untrusted switch ports.

C:

Switch validation ties IP-to-MAC claims to trusted bindings and stops many same-VLAN poisoning attempts; that is useful when the task is to reject forged ARP messages using validated address bindings, not the stated requirement to block rogue DHCP replies from untrusted switch ports.

D:

Comparing the ARP table with authorized gateway mappings reveals redirection inside the broadcast domain; a team would select it to identify a newly forged local IP-to-MAC mapping on a switched subnet, which does not provide the particular result to block rogue DHCP replies from untrusted switch ports.

Question 3

To reject forged ARP messages using validated address bindings, which tool, policy, or technique is appropriate?

  1. IP source guard
  2. SYN cookies
  3. Dynamic ARP inspection
  4. ARP cache inspection

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Switch validation ties IP-to-MAC claims to trusted bindings and stops many same-VLAN poisoning attempts; its relevant protective or investigative effect is to reject forged ARP messages using validated address bindings.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Binding-based filtering on an access port restricts source IP addresses independently of upstream routing rules; the outcome it supports is to stop a host sending packets with a source address it was not assigned, whereas this scenario asks defenders to reject forged ARP messages using validated address bindings.

B:

Stateless cookie encoding avoids allocating ordinary connection state until a client completes the handshake; although relevant to preserve TCP handshake capacity during spoofed half-open connection floods, it does not by itself achieve the required task to reject forged ARP messages using validated address bindings.

D:

Comparing the ARP table with authorized gateway mappings reveals redirection inside the broadcast domain; that is useful when the task is to identify a newly forged local IP-to-MAC mapping on a switched subnet, not the stated requirement to reject forged ARP messages using validated address bindings.

Question 4

To stop a host sending packets with a source address it was not assigned, what safeguard would be most applicable?

  1. IP source guard
  2. DNSSEC validation
  3. DNS response policy zones
  4. DHCP snooping

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Binding-based filtering on an access port restricts source IP addresses independently of upstream routing rules; the requested outcome is precisely to stop a host sending packets with a source address it was not assigned.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Authenticated DNS data verifies signature chains; it does not encrypt the resolver's transport channel; the outcome it supports is to detect forged DNS answers that lack a valid zone signature, whereas this scenario asks defenders to stop a host sending packets with a source address it was not assigned.

C:

Resolver-side response rewriting can deny or redirect named domains based on locally maintained policy; although relevant to block resolution of domains confirmed as malicious by threat policy, it does not by itself achieve the required task to stop a host sending packets with a source address it was not assigned.

D:

Trusted-port enforcement discards unauthorized server responses before clients accept hostile gateway settings; it could help someone trying to block rogue DHCP replies from untrusted switch ports, but the problem is instead to stop a host sending packets with a source address it was not assigned.

Question 5

To reject packets whose source route is inconsistent with the ingress interface, what is the relevant defensive action?

  1. IP source guard
  2. Unicast reverse-path forwarding
  3. Rate limiting
  4. Dynamic ARP inspection
  5. SYN cookies

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

RPF checks reverse routing reachability, reducing spoofed-source traffic when topology and asymmetry are considered; this choice fits the scenario because the team must reject packets whose source route is inconsistent with the ingress interface.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Binding-based filtering on an access port restricts source IP addresses independently of upstream routing rules; the technique works for situations involving stop a host sending packets with a source address it was not assigned, rather than this need to reject packets whose source route is inconsistent with the ingress interface.

C:

Traffic policing reduces abuse volume while leaving permitted traffic possible within the configured threshold; the outcome it supports is to cap bursts of excessive packets toward an exposed service, whereas this scenario asks defenders to reject packets whose source route is inconsistent with the ingress interface.

D:

Switch validation ties IP-to-MAC claims to trusted bindings and stops many same-VLAN poisoning attempts; although relevant to reject forged ARP messages using validated address bindings, it does not by itself achieve the required task to reject packets whose source route is inconsistent with the ingress interface.

E:

Stateless cookie encoding avoids allocating ordinary connection state until a client completes the handshake; it could help someone trying to preserve TCP handshake capacity during spoofed half-open connection floods, but the problem is instead to reject packets whose source route is inconsistent with the ingress interface.

Question 6

To preserve TCP handshake capacity during spoofed half-open connection floods, which option most directly provides the capability?

  1. SYN cookies
  2. Unicast reverse-path forwarding
  3. DNS response policy zones
  4. IP source guard

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Stateless cookie encoding avoids allocating ordinary connection state until a client completes the handshake; this mechanism directly supports the requirement to preserve TCP handshake capacity during spoofed half-open connection floods.

Incorrect Answers

B:

RPF checks reverse routing reachability, reducing spoofed-source traffic when topology and asymmetry are considered; the technique works for situations involving reject packets whose source route is inconsistent with the ingress interface, rather than this need to preserve TCP handshake capacity during spoofed half-open connection floods.

C:

Resolver-side response rewriting can deny or redirect named domains based on locally maintained policy; its mechanism supports block resolution of domains confirmed as malicious by threat policy, while the requested control must be able to preserve TCP handshake capacity during spoofed half-open connection floods.

D:

Binding-based filtering on an access port restricts source IP addresses independently of upstream routing rules; the outcome it supports is to stop a host sending packets with a source address it was not assigned, whereas this scenario asks defenders to preserve TCP handshake capacity during spoofed half-open connection floods.

Question 7

To cap bursts of excessive packets toward an exposed service, which control achieves the target outcome?

  1. DNS response policy zones
  2. IP source guard
  3. Rate limiting
  4. Dynamic ARP inspection

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Traffic policing reduces abuse volume while leaving permitted traffic possible within the configured threshold; it supplies the specific control needed to cap bursts of excessive packets toward an exposed service.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Resolver-side response rewriting can deny or redirect named domains based on locally maintained policy; applying it would serve block resolution of domains confirmed as malicious by threat policy without directly satisfying the goal to cap bursts of excessive packets toward an exposed service.

B:

Binding-based filtering on an access port restricts source IP addresses independently of upstream routing rules; it addresses the different need to stop a host sending packets with a source address it was not assigned, leaving the requested ability to cap bursts of excessive packets toward an exposed service unresolved.

D:

Switch validation ties IP-to-MAC claims to trusted bindings and stops many same-VLAN poisoning attempts; its mechanism supports reject forged ARP messages using validated address bindings, while the requested control must be able to cap bursts of excessive packets toward an exposed service.

Question 8

To detect forged DNS answers that lack a valid zone signature and to block resolution of domains confirmed as malicious by threat policy, which TWO measures should the defender select? Choose TWO.

  1. SYN cookies
  2. RPKI origin validation
  3. DNSSEC validation
  4. DNS response policy zones
  5. BGP route filtering

Explanation

Correct Answers

C:

Authenticated DNS data verifies signature chains; it does not encrypt the resolver's transport channel; it satisfies the distinct requirement to detect forged DNS answers that lack a valid zone signature within the multi-control task.

D:

Resolver-side response rewriting can deny or redirect named domains based on locally maintained policy; it satisfies the distinct requirement to block resolution of domains confirmed as malicious by threat policy within the multi-control task.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Stateless cookie encoding avoids allocating ordinary connection state until a client completes the handshake; its operational purpose is to preserve TCP handshake capacity during spoofed half-open connection floods, not to achieve the specific requirement to detect forged DNS answers that lack a valid zone signature and to block resolution of domains confirmed as malicious by threat policy.

B:

Route origin authorizations support rejecting invalid announcements, but do not authenticate the complete AS path; applying it would serve check whether a BGP origin ASN is authorized for its advertised prefix without directly satisfying the goal to detect forged DNS answers that lack a valid zone signature and to block resolution of domains confirmed as malicious by threat policy.

E:

Inbound and outbound policy rejects unexpected NLRI before it can change routing decisions; its mechanism supports prevent peers from advertising prefixes outside agreed authorizations, while the requested control must be able to detect forged DNS answers that lack a valid zone signature and to block resolution of domains confirmed as malicious by threat policy.

Question 9

To block resolution of domains confirmed as malicious by threat policy, which of the available controls is suitable?

  1. Unicast reverse-path forwarding
  2. DNS response policy zones
  3. Rate limiting
  4. DNSSEC validation

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Resolver-side response rewriting can deny or redirect named domains based on locally maintained policy; its relevant protective or investigative effect is to block resolution of domains confirmed as malicious by threat policy.

Incorrect Answers

A:

RPF checks reverse routing reachability, reducing spoofed-source traffic when topology and asymmetry are considered; a team would select it to reject packets whose source route is inconsistent with the ingress interface, which does not provide the particular result to block resolution of domains confirmed as malicious by threat policy.

C:

Traffic policing reduces abuse volume while leaving permitted traffic possible within the configured threshold; applying it would serve cap bursts of excessive packets toward an exposed service without directly satisfying the goal to block resolution of domains confirmed as malicious by threat policy.

D:

Authenticated DNS data verifies signature chains; it does not encrypt the resolver's transport channel; it addresses the different need to detect forged DNS answers that lack a valid zone signature, leaving the requested ability to block resolution of domains confirmed as malicious by threat policy unresolved.

Question 10

To prevent peers from advertising prefixes outside agreed authorizations, which option is the direct technical match?

  1. Unicast reverse-path forwarding
  2. DNSSEC validation
  3. SYN cookies
  4. DNS response policy zones
  5. BGP route filtering

Explanation

Correct Answer

E:

Inbound and outbound policy rejects unexpected NLRI before it can change routing decisions; the requested outcome is precisely to prevent peers from advertising prefixes outside agreed authorizations.

Incorrect Answers

A:

RPF checks reverse routing reachability, reducing spoofed-source traffic when topology and asymmetry are considered; that is useful when the task is to reject packets whose source route is inconsistent with the ingress interface, not the stated requirement to prevent peers from advertising prefixes outside agreed authorizations.

B:

Authenticated DNS data verifies signature chains; it does not encrypt the resolver's transport channel; a team would select it to detect forged DNS answers that lack a valid zone signature, which does not provide the particular result to prevent peers from advertising prefixes outside agreed authorizations.

C:

Stateless cookie encoding avoids allocating ordinary connection state until a client completes the handshake; its operational purpose is to preserve TCP handshake capacity during spoofed half-open connection floods, not to achieve the specific requirement to prevent peers from advertising prefixes outside agreed authorizations.

D:

Resolver-side response rewriting can deny or redirect named domains based on locally maintained policy; applying it would serve block resolution of domains confirmed as malicious by threat policy without directly satisfying the goal to prevent peers from advertising prefixes outside agreed authorizations.

Certified Network Defender (312-38) Practice Tests