ECCouncil 212-89 (EC-Council Certified Incident Handler) Practice Test 76

Question 750

A manager accuses an employee of theft based only on a DLP alert generated during an approved migration. Which measurement demonstrates that expected protections now hold?

  1. Verify effective permissions match the new job function
  2. Verify all linked accounts, tokens and physical access were removed
  3. Confirm alert disposition with documented evidence and reviewer sign-off
  4. Audit that only approved evidence was accessed and shared

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

For recovery and closure validation involving “Confirm alert disposition with documented” and the report “DLP alert generated during an approved migration”, closure should explain whether the transfer was authorized and why. “Tune DLP correlations using sanctioned transfer windows and approval IDs” is a repair to confirm.

Incorrect Answers

A:

For recovery and closure validation, contrasting “Verify effective permissions match the” with “DLP alert generated during an approved migration”, a revoked explicit grant may still be inherited through old groups. The “DLP alert generated during an approved migration” report requires a finding about “disposition with documented evidence and reviewer sign-off”.

B:

For recovery and closure validation, contrasting “Verify all linked accounts, tokens” with “DLP alert generated during an approved migration”, a single VPN disablement may leave other identity paths active. In “DLP alert generated during an approved migration”, the necessary control concerns “disposition with documented evidence and reviewer sign-off”.

D:

For recovery and closure validation, contrasting “Audit that only approved evidence” with “DLP alert generated during an approved migration”, a defensible investigation documents compliance with its scope. “DLP alert generated during an approved migration” is not evaluated through the “Confirm alert disposition with” requirement.

Question 751

A security team discovers that a compromised service account can delete central application logs. What change best turns containment into lasting eradication?

  1. Instrument security-relevant events with safe, tamper-resistant centralized logging
  2. Adopt append-only or immutable log storage with restricted administrative roles
  3. Rebuild affected session state and validate dependency recovery order
  4. Extend the retention period for central application security logs
  5. Correct the vulnerable server-side logic and regression-test its boundary

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

For eradication and systemic correction involving “Adopt append-only or immutable log” and the report “service account can delete central application logs”, evidence integrity requires controls outside ordinary application permissions. “Revoke the account's log-deletion rights and secure the logging pipeline” is an immediate safeguard rather than systemic prevention.

Incorrect Answers

A:

For eradication and systemic correction, contrasting “Instrument security-relevant events with safe” with “service account can delete central application logs”, durable observability supports future response and accountability. For “Adopt append-only or immutable log storage”, the case record must resolve “service account can delete central application logs”.

C:

For eradication and systemic correction, contrasting “Rebuild affected session state and” with “service account can delete central application logs”, service restoration must include shared backing components. The option does not link “service account can delete central application logs” to “Adopt append-only or immutable log storage with”.

D:

A longer retention period is ineffective if the compromised service identity can delete those same records. Integrity protection and restrictions on destructive privileges are needed.

E:

For eradication and systemic correction, contrasting “Correct the vulnerable server-side logic” with “service account can delete central application logs”, a code or configuration fix removes the exploitable behavior. Only “Adopt append-only or immutable log storage” would test the “service account can delete central application logs” condition.

Question 752

A standard user can call a hidden administrative API by sending the same request body as an administrator. Which post-response observation most strongly supports resolution?

  1. Run cross-user and cross-tenant negative tests before reopening
  2. Test well-signed wrong-audience tokens are consistently rejected
  3. Verify forbidden fields and other users' records remain unchanged under tests
  4. Test denied admin calls from lower-privilege users and allowed calls from admins

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

For recovery and closure validation involving “Test denied admin calls from” and the report “the same request body as an administrator”, negative and positive tests prove the intended permission boundary. “Implement centralized role or permission verification for each action” is the correction whose effectiveness is being retested.

Incorrect Answers

A:

For recovery and closure validation, contrasting “Run cross-user and cross-tenant negative” with “the same request body as an administrator”, no record should be accessible solely by guessing its identifier. For “the same request body as an administrator”, the missing check concerns “denied admin calls from lower-privilege users”.

B:

For recovery and closure validation, contrasting “Test well-signed wrong-audience tokens are” with “the same request body as an administrator”, security must not depend solely on the signature check. “the same request body as an administrator” gives a different evidentiary target: “denied admin calls from lower-privilege users and”.

C:

For recovery and closure validation, contrasting “Verify forbidden fields and other” with “the same request body as an administrator”, a fix requires both property and ownership boundaries. The incident detail “the same request body as an administrator” still calls for “denied admin calls from lower-privilege”.

Question 753

An online catalog search endpoint produces SQL error details when a quotation mark is entered and returns unexpected records for crafted input. Which fix most closely matches the failure mechanism identified?

  1. Disable external entity resolution and adopt hardened parser configuration
  2. Use safe data formats with explicit validation rather than native object deserialization
  3. Use parameterized database queries and appropriate account privileges
  4. Replace shell interpolation with safe APIs and strict input boundaries

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

For eradication and systemic correction involving “Use parameterized database queries and” and the report “and returns unexpected records for crafted input”, binding values as data prevents inputs from changing intended SQL structure. “Restrict the vulnerable endpoint or deploy a narrowly tested virtual patch” is interim risk reduction.

Incorrect Answers

A:

For eradication and systemic correction, contrasting “Disable external entity resolution and” with “and returns unexpected records for crafted input”, the root fix prevents XML documents from causing external reads. The case fact “and returns unexpected records for crafted input” makes “parameterized database queries and appropriate account” the better test.

B:

For eradication and systemic correction, contrasting “Use safe data formats with” with “and returns unexpected records for crafted input”, a constrained schema removes arbitrary class behavior from untrusted input. “database queries and appropriate account privileges” is the criterion not satisfied for “and returns unexpected records for crafted input”.

D:

For eradication and systemic correction, contrasting “Replace shell interpolation with safe” with “and returns unexpected records for crafted input”, avoiding shell parsing eliminates a broad class of command injection. The “parameterized database queries and appropriate account privileges” requirement follows from “and returns unexpected records for crafted input”.

Question 754

A Windows laptop runs an unknown binary immediately after every user logon despite manual termination. What initial handling step should the incident commander coordinate?

  1. Network-isolate the laptop while acquiring its process and persistence state
  2. Restrict the node's egress and preserve the scheduled command definition
  3. Disconnect the host and avoid unplanned firmware updates during evidence collection
  4. Disable the extension across managed profiles and revoke at-risk sessions
  5. Isolate the host while collecting volatile evidence under authorized procedures

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

For immediate response and containment involving “Network-isolate the laptop while acquiring” and the report “after every user logon despite manual termination”, containment prevents outbound control without erasing startup evidence. “Preserve scheduled tasks, startup keys and process creation events” is the evidence path to retain.

Incorrect Answers

B:

For immediate response and containment, contrasting “Restrict the node's egress and” with “after every user logon despite manual termination”, containment reduces command traffic while retaining causal evidence. “after every user logon despite manual termination” is not evaluated through the “laptop while acquiring its process and persistence” requirement.

C:

For immediate response and containment, contrasting “Disconnect the host and avoid” with “after every user logon despite manual termination”, containment and controlled preservation prevent obscuring the boot state. Here, “laptop while acquiring its process and persistence” must account for “after every user logon despite manual termination”.

D:

For immediate response and containment, contrasting “Disable the extension across managed” with “after every user logon despite manual termination”, removal plus session containment limits ongoing credential or content access. “after every user logon despite manual termination” needs a more direct result for “while acquiring its process and persistence state”.

E:

For immediate response and containment, contrasting “Isolate the host while collecting” with “after every user logon despite manual termination”, terminating the process too soon may destroy the best evidence. The comparison turns on “after every user logon despite manual termination” versus “its process and persistence state”.

Question 755

A production control system uses a legacy protocol that lacks built-in authentication and receives spoofed write commands. Which evidence package gives the strongest basis for the case timeline?

  1. Preserve firewall change records, protocol flows and historian gap timestamps
  2. Preserve control-system events, engineering workstation logs and process historian data
  3. Preserve controller change logs, project checksum and workstation evidence
  4. Capture protocol transactions, source paths and controller state changes

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

For evidence selection and preservation involving “Capture protocol transactions, source paths” and the report “built-in authentication and receives spoofed write commands”, command-level evidence distinguishes unauthorized writes from ordinary polling. “Filter write-capable paths and coordinate operational safeguards with engineers” is a response decision requiring reliable provenance.

Incorrect Answers

A:

For evidence selection and preservation, contrasting “Preserve firewall change records, protocol” with “built-in authentication and receives spoofed write commands”, the evidence identifies the rule or route that interrupted telemetry. The option does not link “built-in authentication and receives spoofed write commands” to “transactions source paths and controller state”.

B:

For evidence selection and preservation, contrasting “Preserve control-system events, engineering workstation” with “built-in authentication and receives spoofed write commands”, correlating cyber commands with process state supports a safe decision. “protocol transactions source paths” cannot be inferred from that “built-in authentication and receives spoofed write commands” finding.

C:

For evidence selection and preservation, contrasting “Preserve controller change logs, project” with “built-in authentication and receives spoofed write commands”, version comparison establishes what logic changed and who initiated it. Only “protocol transactions source paths” would test the “built-in authentication and receives spoofed write commands” condition.

Question 756

A router administration console is accessible from a guest Wi-Fi network despite a management VLAN design. Which assessment avoids the most important mistaken assumption here?

  1. Recognize anomalous remote access requiring authorization validation
  2. Recognize excessive egress permissions that expand attacker opportunities
  3. Recognize a network segmentation violation exposing management interfaces
  4. Recognize password spraying across identities rather than a single user's mistake

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

For assessment and interpretation involving “Recognize a network segmentation violation” and the report “Wi-Fi network despite a management VLAN design”, reachability from an untrusted zone increases the opportunity for unauthorized control. “Preserve ACLs, routes, firewall counters and management login logs” is a source for testing the inference.

Incorrect Answers

A:

For assessment and interpretation, contrasting “Recognize anomalous remote access requiring” with “Wi-Fi network despite a management VLAN design”, a successful VPN login can be suspicious when it violates established conditions. The incident detail “Wi-Fi network despite a management VLAN design” still calls for “network segmentation violation exposing management interfaces”.

B:

For assessment and interpretation, contrasting “Recognize excessive egress permissions that” with “Wi-Fi network despite a management VLAN design”, a wide source and destination allowance defeats the intended isolation boundary. “segmentation violation exposing management interfaces” addresses a gap left by the “Wi-Fi network despite a management VLAN design” observation.

D:

A broad account list with a small number of attempts per identity can evade per-account lockout alerts. For “network segmentation violation exposing management interfaces”, the case record must resolve “Wi-Fi network despite a management VLAN design”.

Question 757

A cloud engineer creates an emergency root-like role but does not expire it after an outage. What should be changed to prevent recurrence rather than only quiet alerts?

  1. Require peer approval and immutable auditing for security-control exceptions
  2. Separate access request, approval and implementation duties
  3. Separate author, reviewer and deployer privileges with protected branches
  4. Enforce time-bounded privilege elevation with periodic certification

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

For eradication and systemic correction involving “Enforce time-bounded privilege elevation with” and the report “does not expire it after an outage”, automatic expiry makes exceptional permissions truly temporary. “Collect grant records, use history and incident-linked approval details” is the short-term measure to contrast with remediation.

Incorrect Answers

A:

For eradication and systemic correction, contrasting “Require peer approval and immutable” with “does not expire it after an outage”, independent oversight reduces deliberate and accidental monitoring suppression. For the “does not expire it after an outage” observation, “time-bounded privilege elevation with periodic” remains open.

B:

Segregation prevents one insider from unilaterally granting sensitive access. The “time-bounded privilege elevation with periodic” requirement follows from “does not expire it after an outage”.

C:

For eradication and systemic correction, contrasting “Separate author, reviewer and deployer” with “does not expire it after an outage”, enforced independent review limits both fraud and accidental misconfiguration. “time-bounded privilege elevation with periodic” remains unverified against the reported “does not expire it after an outage”.

Question 758

A newly compromised account sends thousands of external messages before the identity alert is reviewed. Which immediate response is most proportionate to the stated risk?

  1. Suspend suspicious sessions and require identity verification before restoration
  2. Disable the forwarding path and revoke malicious app consent and tokens
  3. Disable the malicious rule and revoke suspicious mailbox sessions
  4. Block the account's outbound sending and revoke suspicious sessions

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

For immediate response and containment involving “Block the account's outbound sending” and the report “messages before the identity alert is reviewed”, immediate send restriction limits damage while investigation continues. “Collect message trace, recipient inventory and session login records” is the evidence path to retain.

Incorrect Answers

A:

For immediate response and containment, contrasting “Suspend suspicious sessions and require” with “messages before the identity alert is reviewed”, containment prioritizes confidential content even when no spam is observed. Here, “the account's outbound sending” must account for “messages before the identity alert is reviewed”.

B:

For immediate response and containment, contrasting “Disable the forwarding path and” with “messages before the identity alert is reviewed”, stopping the routes limits disclosure without relying only on password reset. “messages before the identity alert is reviewed” needs a more direct result for “the account's outbound sending and”.

C:

For immediate response and containment, contrasting “Disable the malicious rule and” with “messages before the identity alert is reviewed”, containment restores message visibility while terminating unauthorized access. The comparison turns on “messages before the identity alert is reviewed” versus “the account's outbound sending”.

Question 759

A terminated employee's VPN account remains active because HR did not send an offboarding notification to IT. Which immediate control should responders apply to this situation?

  1. Remove obsolete grants after confirming necessary current work access
  2. Avoid disciplinary escalation until the security event is validated
  3. Offer an independent protected reporting channel with documented triage
  4. Disable the account and terminate active sessions under approved procedure

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

For immediate response and containment involving “Disable the account and terminate” and the report “not send an offboarding notification to IT”, immediate identity containment closes unnecessary access. “Preserve termination record, account state and remote-access history” is a separate forensic preservation step.

Incorrect Answers

A:

For immediate response and containment, contrasting “Remove obsolete grants after confirming” with “not send an offboarding notification to IT”, proportionate containment supports the new role while reducing exposure. Only “and terminate active sessions under approved procedure” would test the “not send an offboarding notification to IT” condition.

B:

For immediate response and containment, contrasting “Avoid disciplinary escalation until the” with “not send an offboarding notification to IT”, a fair process separates immediate data protection from allegations of misconduct. The “not send an offboarding notification to IT” report requires a finding about “terminate active sessions under approved procedure”.

C:

For immediate response and containment, contrasting “Offer an independent protected reporting” with “not send an offboarding notification to IT”, immediate governance response enables concerns to surface safely. In “not send an offboarding notification to IT”, the necessary control concerns “terminate active sessions under approved procedure”.

Question 760

An employee accidentally sends a spreadsheet of customer addresses to the wrong external contact. What recovery test specifically addresses the earlier failure mode?

  1. Confirm no additional outbound mail alerts appear for the original sender
  2. Confirm only approved identities can open and modify the file
  3. Document recipient response, exposure assessment and corrective measures
  4. Verify the revoked token fails and no unauthorized API uses occurred
  5. Test that noncompliant devices cannot access protected segments

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

For recovery and closure validation involving “Document recipient response, exposure assessment” and the report “customer addresses to the wrong external contact”, closure must reflect residual uncertainty about already delivered copies. “Introduce recipient verification and data classification prompts for sensitive mail” is the correction whose effectiveness is being retested.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A quiet sender alert feed cannot prove what the unintended recipient retained, disclosed, or deleted. Closure needs evidence of the recipient response and an impact assessment.

B:

For recovery and closure validation, contrasting “Confirm only approved identities can” with “customer addresses to the wrong external contact”, a new shared password would perpetuate the same control failure. For “recipient response exposure assessment”, the case record must resolve “customer addresses to the wrong external contact”.

D:

For recovery and closure validation, contrasting “Verify the revoked token fails” with “customer addresses to the wrong external contact”, closure requires credential invalidation and usage review. The option does not link “customer addresses to the wrong external contact” to “response exposure assessment and corrective measures”.

E:

For recovery and closure validation, contrasting “Test that noncompliant devices cannot” with “customer addresses to the wrong external contact”, a written device policy does not prove enforcement. “recipient response exposure assessment” cannot be inferred from that “customer addresses to the wrong external contact” finding.

EC-Council Certified Incident Handler (212-89) Practice Tests