ECCouncil 212-89 (EC-Council Certified Incident Handler) Practice Test 46

Question 450

A volatile process list differs between two investigators because one waited half an hour before collection. Which TWO measures together limit the active risk and repair its underlying cause? Choose TWO.

  1. Configure trustworthy time synchronization and standardized response tooling
  2. Pause replacement only through an approved safe containment mechanism
  3. Coordinate one time-synchronized collection sequence for the live host
  4. Improve playbooks to collect RAM before shutdown when safe and lawful
  5. Build DNS-state capture into pre-reboot response procedures
  6. Route workload logs off-host and automate ephemeral evidence capture

Explanation

Correct Answers

A:

For immediate response and containment involving “Configure trustworthy time synchronization and” and the report “one waited half an hour before collection”, consistent clocks and collector procedures improve correlation across responders. “Retain collection timestamps, command output and collector identity” is an additional source of incident evidence.

C:

For immediate response and containment involving “Coordinate one time-synchronized collection sequence” and the report “one waited half an hour before collection”, a shared acquisition plan reduces redundant commands and ambiguity. “Retain collection timestamps, command output and collector identity” is the corroboration step, where safe.

Incorrect Answers

B:

For immediate response and containment, contrasting “Pause replacement only through an” with “one waited half an hour before collection”, coordinated retention protects evidence without creating an unbounded service risk. “one waited half an hour before collection” needs a more direct result for “time synchronization and standardized response tooling”.

D:

For immediate response and containment, contrasting “Improve playbooks to collect RAM” with “one waited half an hour before collection”, a defined order of volatility prevents irreversible evidence loss. The case fact “one waited half an hour before collection” makes “Configure trustworthy time synchronization and standardized” the better test.

E:

For immediate response and containment, contrasting “Build DNS-state capture into pre-reboot” with “one waited half an hour before collection”, automation should record resolver data without requiring ad hoc analyst intervention. “Coordinate one time-synchronized collection sequence” is the criterion not satisfied for “one waited half an hour before collection”.

F:

For immediate response and containment, contrasting “Route workload logs off-host and” with “one waited half an hour before collection”, centralized evidence survives routine container recycling. For the “one waited half an hour before collection” observation, “trustworthy time synchronization and standardized response” remains open.

Question 451

An employee uses a personal cloud-sync account to copy internal source-code repositories from a managed laptop. What engineering or process change closes the original failure path?

  1. Block unsanctioned storage apps and provide controlled collaboration alternatives
  2. Enforce sensitivity labels and external-sharing restrictions in the service
  3. Apply managed removable-media encryption and export approvals
  4. Apply data classification and approved bulk-transfer controls for sensitive repositories

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

For eradication and systemic correction involving “Block unsanctioned storage apps and” and the report “internal source-code repositories from a managed laptop”, employees need approved workflows that reduce pressure to bypass policy. “Pause unauthorized synchronization and secure the endpoint and account” is an immediate safeguard rather than systemic prevention.

Incorrect Answers

B:

For eradication and systemic correction, contrasting “Enforce sensitivity labels and external-sharing” with “internal source-code repositories from a managed laptop”, policy should govern sharing scope, not only which application is used. The “internal source-code repositories from a managed laptop” report requires a finding about “storage apps and provide controlled collaboration”.

C:

Allowing approved encrypted devices supports legitimate work securely. In “internal source-code repositories from a managed laptop”, the necessary control concerns “unsanctioned storage apps and provide controlled collaboration”.

D:

For eradication and systemic correction, contrasting “Apply data classification and approved” with “internal source-code repositories from a managed laptop”, policy enforcement reduces opportunities for unauthorized copies. For this “internal source-code repositories from a managed laptop” event, “apps and provide controlled collaboration alternatives” is still outstanding.

Question 452

An attacker exploits a public UDP reflector, causing responses far larger than requests to flood a victim. Which measurement demonstrates that expected protections now hold?

  1. Confirm legitimate domain queries resolve reliably under attack simulation
  2. Confirm unaffected applications remain reachable during mitigation
  3. Test latency and error rates for genuine customers under controlled load
  4. Confirm legitimate UDP services function while attack volume is scrubbed

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Mitigation should distinguish malicious reflected responses from authorized traffic. “Harden exposed amplifiers and advocate source-address validation on networks” is a control change requiring validation.

Incorrect Answers

A:

For recovery and closure validation, contrasting “Confirm legitimate domain queries resolve” with “larger than requests to flood a victim”, the end-user test is successful resolution, not zero malicious queries. Against “larger than requests to flood a victim”, this does not establish “services function while”.

B:

For recovery and closure validation, contrasting “Confirm unaffected applications remain reachable” with “larger than requests to flood a victim”, success requires verifying services outside the attack target. For “UDP services function while attack”, the case record must resolve “larger than requests to flood a victim”.

C:

For recovery and closure validation, contrasting “Test latency and error rates” with “larger than requests to flood a victim”, network availability alone does not prove the application recovered. “larger than requests to flood a victim” is why proof of “legitimate UDP services function while” matters here.

Question 453

A password-reset endpoint accepts a recovery code repeatedly even after its first successful use. What is the best immediate step for the on-call response team?

  1. Disable dangerous update fields until server-side checks are deployed
  2. Disable the route for unapproved roles using server-side enforcement
  3. Invalidate exposed reset codes and protect affected accounts
  4. Revoke affected sessions and reduce exposure of reusable tokens

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

For immediate response and containment involving “Invalidate exposed reset codes and” and the report “repeatedly even after its first successful use”, containment blocks replay while administrators assess unauthorized changes. “Preserve token issuance and redemption events without logging secrets” is the collection task to coordinate with containment.

Incorrect Answers

A:

For immediate response and containment, contrasting “Disable dangerous update fields until” with “repeatedly even after its first successful use”, narrow containment prevents further account manipulation. “reset codes and protect affected accounts” remains unverified against the reported “repeatedly even after its first successful use”.

B:

For immediate response and containment, contrasting “Disable the route for unapproved” with “repeatedly even after its first successful use”, a backend check is the containment point, not a client interface change. For “repeatedly even after its first successful use”, the missing check concerns “reset codes and protect affected accounts”.

D:

For immediate response and containment, contrasting “Revoke affected sessions and reduce” with “repeatedly even after its first successful use”, immediate invalidation cuts off access from stolen or stale credentials. The incident detail “repeatedly even after its first successful use” still calls for “Invalidate exposed reset codes and”.

Question 454

A decryptor restored filenames but many recovered documents still fail application integrity checks. Which near-term intervention best fits these operational constraints?

  1. Disconnect the affected share from write access while investigating writers
  2. Quarantine affected machines while protecting critical evidence and shares
  3. Hold damaged datasets from production workflows pending verification
  4. Preserve isolated backup sets and invoke incident leadership and legal counsel
  5. Revoke the exposed token and block the appliance's unauthorized sessions

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

For immediate response and containment involving “Hold damaged datasets from production” and the report “recovered documents still fail application integrity checks”, preventing use of corrupt files protects downstream transactions. “Compare file hashes, application checksums and unaffected backup versions” is the artifact-preservation requirement.

Incorrect Answers

A:

For immediate response and containment, contrasting “Disconnect the affected share from” with “recovered documents still fail application integrity checks”, containing the storage path stops repeated damage while maintaining evidence. The comparison turns on “recovered documents still fail application integrity checks” versus “Hold damaged datasets from production workflows”.

B:

For immediate response and containment, contrasting “Quarantine affected machines while protecting” with “recovered documents still fail application integrity checks”, network isolation limits spread during persistence investigation. The case fact “recovered documents still fail application integrity checks” makes “damaged datasets from production workflows pending” the better test.

D:

For immediate response and containment, contrasting “Preserve isolated backup sets and” with “recovered documents still fail application integrity checks”, controlled decisions protect recovery options and address possible obligations. For the “recovered documents still fail application integrity checks” observation, “datasets from production workflows pending verification” remains open.

E:

For immediate response and containment, contrasting “Revoke the exposed token and” with “recovered documents still fail application integrity checks”, protecting remaining recovery material is more urgent than starting an untrusted restore. The “damaged datasets from production workflows pending” requirement follows from “recovered documents still fail application integrity checks”.

Question 455

A legitimate newsletter service sends on behalf of a firm, but recipients reject it after a strict domain-authentication policy change. What should be preserved to support a defensible investigation?

  1. Inspect DKIM-Signature fields, body hash and verifier results
  2. Collect original and forwarded headers with authentication results
  3. Preserve complete headers including Return-Path and Authentication-Results
  4. Collect headers and sender-domain alignment results for affected mail

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The details distinguish routing problems from SPF, DKIM or DMARC misconfiguration. “Temporarily route affected authorized mail for review without disabling all protection” is a decision driven by these records.

Incorrect Answers

A:

For evidence selection and preservation, contrasting “Inspect DKIM-Signature fields, body hash” with “it after a strict domain-authentication policy change”, cryptographic verification shows whether signed content survived transit intact. In “it after a strict domain-authentication policy change”, the necessary control concerns “Collect headers and sender-domain”.

B:

For evidence selection and preservation, contrasting “Collect original and forwarded headers” with “it after a strict domain-authentication policy change”, hop-by-hop evidence clarifies whether alignment or signature integrity survived forwarding. For this “it after a strict domain-authentication policy change” event, “and sender-domain alignment” is still outstanding.

C:

For evidence selection and preservation, contrasting “Preserve complete headers including Return-Path” with “it after a strict domain-authentication policy change”, envelope and authentication metadata reveal which domains and IPs were actually checked. “it after a strict domain-authentication policy change” is not evaluated through the “sender-domain alignment results for affected mail” requirement.

Question 456

A laptop's EDR sensor stops reporting after suspicious administrator commands and the machine remains online. Which verification best confirms that the original weakness is controlled?

  1. Test outbound and lateral reachability on each physical and virtual adapter
  2. Verify no abnormal child processes occur during controlled application use
  3. Test reboot behavior with full telemetry and confirm no task resurrection
  4. Verify sensor heartbeat, policy compliance and test-alert delivery

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

For recovery and closure validation involving “Verify sensor heartbeat, policy compliance” and the report “administrator commands and the machine remains online”, a running process icon does not prove security events reach the console. “Repair agent protection and investigate the privilege used to disable it” is the remediation record that supports sign-off.

Incorrect Answers

A:

For recovery and closure validation, contrasting “Test outbound and lateral reachability” with “administrator commands and the machine remains online”, a dashboard status alone is not evidence of complete isolation. “administrator commands and the machine remains online” is why proof of “sensor heartbeat policy compliance and test-alert” matters here.

B:

For recovery and closure validation, contrasting “Verify no abnormal child processes” with “administrator commands and the machine remains online”, recovery requires watching the exploited behavior, not just the file name. The option does not link “administrator commands and the machine remains online” to “heartbeat policy compliance and test-alert delivery”.

C:

For recovery and closure validation, contrasting “Test reboot behavior with full” with “administrator commands and the machine remains online”, recovery should exercise the mechanism that previously relaunched code. “sensor heartbeat policy compliance and test-alert delivery” cannot be inferred from that “administrator commands and the machine remains online” finding.

Question 457

An application server reports successful SMB connections to a domain controller from an account never approved for administrative access. Which action best balances containment and preservation needs?

  1. Disable the stale identity and isolate associated unauthorized sessions
  2. Block management-plane access from guest segments immediately
  3. Suspend the questionable session and verify the vendor through trusted contacts
  4. Revoke exposed credential sessions and restrict SMB reachability

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

For immediate response and containment involving “Revoke exposed credential sessions and” and the report “an account never approved for administrative access”, containing identity and traffic prevents continued movement while investigating. “Collect logon events, SMB share access and originating process lineage” is the evidence path to retain.

Incorrect Answers

A:

For immediate response and containment, contrasting “Disable the stale identity and” with “an account never approved for administrative access”, identity containment closes the immediate lateral access path. “an account never approved for administrative access” gives a different evidentiary target: “Revoke exposed credential”.

B:

For immediate response and containment, contrasting “Block management-plane access from guest” with “an account never approved for administrative access”, selective filtering contains exposure without disconnecting the whole network. The incident detail “an account never approved for administrative access” still calls for “exposed credential sessions and restrict SMB”.

C:

For immediate response and containment, contrasting “Suspend the questionable session and” with “an account never approved for administrative access”, controlled interruption limits exposure while avoiding unreviewed access. “exposed credential sessions and restrict SMB reachability” addresses a gap left by the “an account never approved for administrative access” observation.

Question 458

A security analyst repeatedly disables EDR for a test that has no approved change record. Which condition should the service owner confirm before final sign-off?

  1. Test EDR telemetry across previously excluded endpoints after restoration
  2. Confirm privileged exports require approval and no unreviewed data transfers persist
  3. Confirm executive mail is accessible only under documented approved grants
  4. Verify sensitive changes map to identifiable users and approved sessions

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

For recovery and closure validation involving “Test EDR telemetry across previously” and the report “test that has no approved change record”, re-enabling a toggle does not prove events are reaching the SOC. “Require peer approval and immutable auditing for security-control exceptions” is a repair to confirm.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Closure needs both factual investigation and functioning controls. For the “test that has no approved change record” observation, “EDR telemetry across previously excluded” remains open.

C:

For recovery and closure validation, contrasting “Confirm executive mail is accessible” with “test that has no approved change record”, a full permission review must include inherited and delegated rights. The “EDR telemetry across previously excluded” requirement follows from “test that has no approved change record”.

D:

For recovery and closure validation, contrasting “Verify sensitive changes map to” with “test that has no approved change record”, a logging system is useful only if identities are personally attributable. “across previously excluded endpoints after restoration” remains unverified against the reported “test that has no approved change record”.

Question 459

An antivirus engine quarantines a file but multiple sibling endpoints run a modified version of the same malicious script. What engineering or process change closes the original failure path?

  1. Rotate affected credentials and repair the account-provisioning weakness
  2. Deploy behavior-based rules and remove the distribution source
  3. Rebuild packages from verified source and restore trusted signing controls
  4. Clean or replace affected media and harden execution controls
  5. Sanitize restored data and harden macro and attachment execution policy

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Eradication addresses the common technique and staging mechanism. “Contain affected endpoint groups with scoped EDR policies” is the interim response.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Removing one key is insufficient if the attacker can write new ones. “modified version of the same malicious script” is not evaluated through the “Deploy behavior-based rules and remove” requirement.

C:

A clean release pipeline removes the contaminated distribution path. “modified version of the same malicious script” needs a more direct result for “Deploy behavior-based rules and remove”.

D:

Root cause includes the contaminated media and permissive autorun policy. The comparison turns on “modified version of the same malicious script” versus “rules and remove the distribution source”.

E:

Data recovery must exclude active malicious content and unsafe execution defaults. The case fact “modified version of the same malicious script” makes “behavior-based rules and remove the distribution source” the better test.

Question 460

A company publishes SPF records through several overlapping includes and receives intermittent permerror results. What should the analyst recognize before making a response decision?

  1. Recognize display-domain spoofing requiring authentication alignment checks
  2. Recognize forwarding-related SPF failure and evaluate any aligned DKIM pass
  3. Recognize an SPF evaluation configuration problem
  4. Recognize message-integrity failure detectable by DKIM validation

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

For assessment and interpretation involving “Recognize an SPF evaluation configuration” and the report “overlapping includes and receives intermittent permerror results”, the SPF specification limits DNS-lookup mechanisms, and overcomplex policies can fail evaluation. “Inspect the evaluated SPF path and DNS lookup outcomes” is the independent record to examine.

Incorrect Answers

A:

For assessment and interpretation, contrasting “Recognize display-domain spoofing requiring authentication” with “overlapping includes and receives intermittent permerror results”, a familiar header name does not establish authorization to send as the domain. “an SPF evaluation configuration problem” cannot be inferred from that “overlapping includes and receives intermittent permerror results” finding.

B:

Forwarding changes sending IP context. Only “an SPF evaluation configuration problem” would test the “overlapping includes and receives intermittent permerror results” condition.

D:

For assessment and interpretation, contrasting “Recognize message-integrity failure detectable by” with “overlapping includes and receives intermittent permerror results”, a changed signed body can invalidate the hash protected by the signature. In “overlapping includes and receives intermittent permerror results”, the necessary control concerns “an SPF evaluation configuration problem”.

EC-Council Certified Incident Handler (212-89) Practice Tests